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ABSTRACT
The public history project described herein was performed at Blakeley
Historic Park, Alabama. The project included the preparation of survey maps
depicting the location, size and directional orientation of Confederate and Union
earthworks, which were used during the siege and battle of Fort Blakely in April
1865. The project also included historical research and documentation of findings
relative to the design, construction and use of the Confederate fortifications at
Blakeley Park. This research attempts to answer the questions; who ordered or
directed the earthworks to be built, who designed them and supervised their
construction, when were they built, and who provided the labor for their
construction? Recommendations are made for the acquisition potential of
earthworks found that were outside of present park boundaries. In addition,
recommendations are made for preservation of existing earthworks within the
park. The historical essay on the Confederate fortifications advances the argument
that the design and construction effort was beset with shortages of engineers
needed for design and supervision, shortages of labor needed for construction,
and a shortage of troops to man the fortifications.
Because this project combined modern day Global Positioning System
surveying and Geographic Information System mapping technology with historical
research methodology, collaboration with faculty experts in the College of
Engineering and Computer Science was essential.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Six hours after General Robert E. Lee formally surrendered the Army of
Northern Virginia to Union commander General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox,
Virginia, the last major battle of the Civil War was fought at Fort Blakely 1 ,
Alabama, ten miles northeast of Mobile on the bluffs overlooking the Tensaw
River. On April 9, 1865, after an eight-day siege, 16,000 Union troops under Major
General Frederick Steele overran the Confederate fortifications defended by 2,700
Confederates under Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell.
The fall of Fort Blakely had been preceded by the capture of Spanish Fort,
five miles to the south, on April 8th. With the loss of these two riverfront forts,
which protected Confederate water batteries on the western shore of the
Apalachee River, the water approaches to the city of Mobile were no longer
defensible. Consequently, the Confederate commander of the District of the Gulf,
Major General Dabney H. Maury, ordered the military evacuation of Mobile, and
the mayor of the city surrendered Mobile to the Union Army. Formal surrender of
the Confederate Department of the Mississippi, Alabama and Southeast
Louisiana, by Lieutenant General Richard Taylor followed on May 5, 1865.

1

I employ the Civil War era spelling of “Blakely” when referring to the historic town site, fort, or
river, and the present-day spelling, "Blakeley” when referring to the State Park.
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Background
Historic Blakeley State Park, opened in 1981, now encompasses 3,800
acres surrounding the site of the historic town of Blakely and including most of the
Civil War battlefield. The major feature of the battlefield is the two-mile long arc of
Confederate rifle pits that connect nine earthen redoubts (forts), which are spaced
along the defensive line. Also remaining are large portions of the opposing Union
rifle pits, artillery emplacements, and saps (zig zag trenches used during siege
operations to advance entrenchments closer to enemy lines). Although park land
was originally acquired to preserve and protect the historic features, the primary
public attractions today are the campgrounds, nature trails and a boardwalk along
the waterfront.
A small part of the battlefield, adjacent to Confederate redoubt no. 4 and
the 115th Massachusetts Battery, has been restored by clearing of the forest cover
and placement of railroad ties to shore earthen walls and gun embrasures within
the fort. This location along the battle line is the only place where the opposing
Confederate and Union lines are clearly visible to each other, and for this reason it
is very popular with Civil War re-enactor groups. The remainder of the battlefield is
now heavily forested, which limits one's line-of-sight and obscures Confederate
and Union positions from one another. The park maintains a hiking trail that
follows the line of Confederate earthworks for a major portion of its length. This
hiking trail is currently the only means of visitor access to the battlefield except for
2

dirt roads that provide vehicle access to the cleared area around Confederate
redoubt no. 4. Park management would like to further restore the battlefield and
improve visitor access and viewing along the entire battle line, but lack of funding
is a major obstacle. These remaining earthworks, both Union and Confederate,
are the focus of this public history project.

Project Description
This public history thesis project has two parts, the first part consisting of
the creation of work products that will be used by Blakeley Historic Park to support
ongoing restoration and interpretive projects. The second part consists of
preparing a historical essay that addresses the impediments faced by the
Confederate Army in the design, construction and effective use of their
fortifications at Fort Blakely.

Part One: Earthworks Mapping and Historical Research
Park Director JoAnn Flirt and I agreed to the objectives of this project during an
August 2008 meeting. We were in agreement that the project should result in a
benefit to the park, should be consistent with my interests as a public historian,
and should conform to the University's requirements for a Master's Thesis public
history project. A project meeting all these criteria was formulated, and three
primary objectives were outlined, each related to a specific work product as
follows:

3



Produce an accurate geo-location map of existing Civil War earthworks to aid
park management's planning and execution of future restoration and/or
preservation projects and to establish the start of a Geographic Information
System mapping database that encompasses the park’s historical resources.



Create detailed sketches/drawings depicting the geometry of the Confederate
redoubts as well as that of Union artillery emplacements to aid in the
restoration and/or interpretation of the individual works.



Create a research file or database of information related to the design and
construction of the Confederate and Union earthworks to support future park
restoration and interpretation projects and to support the preparation of visitor
brochures presenting historical information relative to the park’s Civil War
fortifications.

Objective No. One
The precise location of the existing earthworks at Blakeley Park had not
been established using present-day technology and surveying techniques. The
Union forces accomplished a reasonably thorough mapping of the Blakely
fortifications after the battle, but this map, shown in Figure 1, depicts the
fortifications as they existed in 1865, and probably does not represent the presentday status due to the one-hundred forty years of erosion by the elements as well
as the destructive effects of farming and logging operations associated with the
private and commercial ownership of the land prior to the 1980s. In addition, the
digging of relic hunters and “restoration” by later day Civil War re-enactors may
4

have disturbed or destroyed original features of the earthworks. In any case, the
1865 map provides no usable geo-location information. Modern day topographical
maps created by the U.S. Geological Survey include the needed geo-location
references, but even these maps are based on 1940 survey data. In addition, the
U.S. Geological Survey mapping was incomplete and it lacks detail of the
individual works.

2

Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Plate 71-14, GPO

Figure 1. Union Map of Blakeley Fortifications, 1865

2

Telephone interview with Bob Kimmel, U.S. Geological Survey, February 12, 2009, relative to the
original date of the USGS topographical map titled "Hurricane, Alabama."
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Creation of a new map of the Civil War earthworks using survey equipment
having Global Positioning System accuracy and the maintenance of the map in a
Geographic Information System software application could be extremely useful to
the staff of Blakeley Historic Park. For example, the mapping database could be
used to plan future improvements for increased public access to the earthworks by
constructing new roads and trails. For those portions of the earthworks that are
being damaged by erosion, the mapping database can be used to prioritize
preservation and restoration efforts and to more effectively manage the historical
assets of the park.
The creation of a mapping database for the park's Civil War earthworks
could also be the first step in a plan to develop and use a Geographic Information
System application to document and manage all of the park's resources both
natural and historical. Park Director JoAnn Flirt, already has such a plan and
intends to acquire the Global Positioning System survey equipment along with the
computer hardware and Geographic Information System software needed to
develop an in-house park capability for developing and maintaining a resource
mapping database. This type of database could be used by park staff to document
and manage the different types of habitats within the park including the pine
forests, hardwood forests, waterways, grasslands, swamps and coastal wetlands.
The database could be used to identify and prioritize areas needing controlled
burns to reduce underbrush, areas that could be logged to provide revenue, and to
record locations of endangered animal species and exotic plant species. Lastly the
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mapping database could be used to create highly accurate maps of park
resources for use by park visitors as well as by the staff.

Objective No. Two
The creation of detailed maps or sketches of individual redoubts and
artillery batteries within the park will be used as reference data by park staff to
support restoration and interpretive projects related to the earthworks. As
previously mentioned, only two of the individual works have been restored;
Confederate redoubt no. 4 and the 115th Massachusetts Battery. The detailed
survey maps will establish the geometry and directional orientation of each work.
In some cases, it may be possible to determine original outlines and
characteristics of particular geometric features using fortification design manuals in
use by the engineering officers at the time of the Civil War. Comparison of the
present-day geometry with historical maps and first-hand descriptions can be used
to identify those modifications or additions that will be needed for restoration to the
original design. As a parallel task, the park director requested that my
investigations into the design of the individual works address the relevance of
engineering calculations and sketches contained in the journal of Lt. Maurice
Garland, a Confederate engineer assigned to Fort Blakely. She believed that this
primary source data might contain details pertinent to the original design of the
nine Confederate redoubts. I planned to compare my detailed maps of the
individual redoubts with the sketches in the Garland journal to establish any
correlation between the two.
7

In many cases, increased public access to secluded individual works can
only be achieved by construction of new access roads which is usually a costly
endeavor. However, it may be economically feasible in some cases to construct a
replica of a fort at an easily accessible location, and in such cases as this, the
detailed maps of the individual works can be used to create exact replicas. This
approach has the added advantage that the original work, which many historians
and enthusiasts consider to be "hallowed ground" that should not be disturbed,
does not get subjected to the wear and tear of increased foot traffic nor to the
shovel and bulldozer of the restoration crew.

Objective No. Three
A third objective of the project was to provide historical information related
to the design, construction and use of the Confederate and Union earthworks that
would support future park restoration and interpretation projects. The research
would also include any information that could be gleaned with respect to the
demonstrated effectiveness (or lack of effectiveness) of the works during the siege
and battle. The questions that this research attempted to answer are:


Why were Blakeley's defensive fortifications constructed?



Who initiated the construction of Confederate fortifications at Blakeley?



Who designed them?



Who built the Confederate/Union fortifications and when?



What were the significant features of the Confederate/Union fortifications?



Was the design simple or did it incorporate more sophisticated features?
8

o Did design of earthworks evolved over the course of the war?
o How did their design relate to the lay of the land and to the presence or
absence of vegetation?
o How were obstructions used to increase the effectiveness of the
defensive fortifications?


Have the fortifications and entrenchments been adequately stabilized or is
there risk of significant natural erosion or damage by animal/human traffic?
I also compare and contrast the defensive fortifications of the Confederates

with the siege works constructed by the Union. For example, the historical record
indicates the earthworks of the Confederates were constructed and strengthened
over a period of seven or eight months, while those of the Union were designed
and built in only seven or eight days. I examined evidence that the earthworks
constructed at Blakely represented the state-of-the art in military field fortifications
at the time they were constructed. The historical evidence revealed that; 1) the
earthworks were designed by experienced engineers who had designed some of
the most successful fortifications of the four-year conflict, 2) the earthworks
incorporated features that were the result of four-years of design evolution, and 3)
the Confederates made extensive use of emerging technology by incorporating a
network of land mines into their design, as well as incorporation of mechanical
innovations related to movement of artillery pieces in and out of firing position.
Research also indicated that the Confederate defenders incorporated a fatal flaw
into their defensive works and employed tactics that enabled the attacking Union
Army to overrun their lines after a short but intense battle.
9

Part Two: Historical Essay
For the second part of the thesis report, I focused on historical research
related to the design, construction and use of the Confederate earthworks at
Blakely. I examined the details of how the Confederate efforts to improve the
defenses of Mobile, including the design and construction of the eastern shore
fortifications at Spanish Fort and at Blakely, were enormous engineering projects
that were beset with shortages of all kinds, but particularly with shortages of
engineering officers, construction laborers, and in the end a shortage of soldiers to
man the works. I argue that by extraordinary efforts the Confederates overcame
the shortages of engineers and laborers, but that the shortage of soldiers proved
insurmountable and predestined their defeat at Fort Blakely.

10

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Primary Union Sources
History of the Campaign of Mobile
Any serious study of the Mobile campaign should begin with C. C. Andrews
History of the Campaign of Mobile first published in 1867 and still in print today.
Andrews focused on the Federal land campaign against Mobile in which he was a
participant, commanding one of four Union Army divisions at the siege of Fort
Blakely in April of 1865. Andrew’s book is unusual in this respect because most
monographs dealing with the Mobile campaign concentrate on the dramatic naval
battle of Mobile Bay that occurred in August of 1864, and pay scant attention to
the army operations on the eastern shore of Mobile bay in the spring of 1865. The
focus of my thesis project is the earthen fortifications used by the respective
armies at Fort Blakely, therefore, I will not address in detail the defensive works
constructed around the city of Mobile proper or the fortifications at Spanish Fort,
which were located five miles south of Fort Blakely.
Andrews' account is surprisingly balanced between North and South with
details of Confederate operations most likely obtained through his post war
associations with Confederate commanders since few after-battle reports were
filed by southern officers, most having been either captured as prisoners of war or
otherwise occupied by their hasty retreat from Mobile after the fall of Fort Blakely.
Andrews’ work is valuable because it provides an accurate chronology of the
11

military operations as well as a reliable identification of the military units, both
North and South, which participated in the operations. Andrews also stressed the
importance of the engineering operations associated with design and construction
of Mobile’s defenses which spanned a period of approximately three years and
included three separate lines of fortifications around the city, each one designed
by a different chief engineer.

3

The principal forts protecting the main entrance into Mobile Bay were Fort
Morgan on the east side of the entrance and Fort Gaines on the west side. Days
after the Union fleet successfully ran past Fort Morgan on the 5th of August 1864,
both forts surrendered to Union forces following artillery bombardments. Although
the Union fleet gained control of Mobile Bay, the city proper was protected from
naval attack by underwater obstructions and torpedoes (called mines today)
placed in the main ship channel, and also by artillery batteries placed strategically
along the channel. Southern blockade-runners, however, could still use a
roundabout water approach to reach the city wharfs. This approach involved
negotiating a narrow channel through obstructions and torpedoes in rivers that
emptied into the northeast corner of upper Mobile Bay. The complicated path
wound through parts of the Blakely, Apalachee, Tensaw, Raft, Spanish and Mobile
Rivers as shown in Figure 2. Protecting this approach were two primary river
batteries; battery Tracy on the western bank of the Apalachee, and battery Huger

3

C. C. Andrews, History of the Campaign of Mobile; Including the Cooperative Operations of Gen.
Wilson’s Cavalry in Alabama (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1866; reprint, Barney E. Tyree, Jr.,
1994), 10-11.

12

one thousand yards downstream at the head of Blakely Island, which separated
the Blakely and Apalachee rivers.

Base Image Courtesy Of US Geological Survey

Figure 2. Eastern Shore Water Route to Mobile
Due east of the river batteries, the eastern shore of the Apalachee River
consisted of low wetlands and marshes that comprised part of the Bay Minette
swamp. Upstream or north of the swampy area there was high ground on the
eastern shore of the Apalachee at the town of Blakely, about three and one-half
13

miles distant from the river batteries. Downstream of the swampy area there was
high ground on the eastern shore at the site of an old Spanish Fort, about one and
one-half miles distant from the river batteries. The Confederates constructed fairly
extensive field fortifications at both of these locations, each site consisting of a
long semi-circle of rifle pits connecting redoubts or batteries that housed artillery
totaling about forty guns at each location, the defensive line being two and onehalf miles long at Blakely and two miles long at Spanish Fort. Andrews’ description
of the fortifications at Blakely and Spanish Fort is quite detailed and is oft repeated
in the historical literature.

4

Andrews provided a concise critique of the tactics employed by both sides
at Blakely, rendering both commendation and criticism for those deserving of
either. He praised the Confederate defenders for manifesting "much energy and
spirit during the siege, often making bold sallies in the night, and disturbing the
besiegers." Andrews observed that Confederate morale was high; even when they
knew an assault was coming, they were confident they would repulse it. He also
has praise for the Union soldiers for the hard work they performed, digging night
and day with little rest, laying down several miles of entrenchments and
approaches, which "will long remain as proof of the labor that was done."

5

Andrews noted a couple of Confederate tactical mistakes that contributed to
the success of the Union assault. The Confederates employed advanced rifle pits
that were too far advanced from their main line of entrenchments, causing a
problem for the Confederates when the final Union assault was launched. This
4
5

Ibid., see 48-49, 122.
Ibid., 223-226.
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flaw in the Confederate tactics will be examined further in Chapter Four. Andrews
also observed that the Confederates never mounted the parapets of their
breastworks when closely attacked, as required by the standard rules for
defending fortifications. 6
Union and Confederate commanding officers did not escape Andrews'
critical eye. He faults the Confederate commander at Mobile for not withdrawing
the Blakely garrison as soon as Spanish Fort fell, because the federal troops at
Spanish Fort immediately became available for duty at Blakely, giving the Union
troops a potential eight-to-one advantage over the Confederates - impossible odds
to overcome. He also faults the Union commander for not investing the entire
Confederate line. The southern end of the Confederate line (at redoubt no. 9) was
at the edge of a bluff overlooking the Bay Minette swamp which Union
commanders deemed impassable. The Confederates, however, had constructed a
road or footpath across the swamp that connected Blakely with Spanish Fort, and
actually received 1000 reinforcements that had evacuated Spanish Fort via this
footpath (General Maury did not let them remain at Blakely, however, and sent
them to Mobile by steamer). The Union commanders had not followed the first rule
of siege operations - deny the enemy all ingress and egress. Andrews states that
the swamp was narrow and could easily have been bridged, leaving no excuse for
not investing the entire Confederate garrison. Andrews' criticisms are insightful

6

Ibid., 224.
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and are unmatched in the historical literature due, undoubtedly, to the fact they are
based on his personal experience and eyewitness observations.

7

Official Records of the War
Also indispensable in the study of the Mobile campaign is The War of the
Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies. This source contains the reports of over ninety Union commanders and
officers that participated in the operations against Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely
during the period March 17 through April 12, 1865. Especially informative are the
reports of the Union commander at Blakely, Major General Frederick Steele, and
his four division commanders. Not only do they provide details of the siege
operations and of the final assault on April 9, they also offer much information
regarding the construction of the Union artillery batteries, rifle pits and
approaches. 8
Federal engineering operations at Blakely began with an examination or
reconnoitering of the Confederate fortifications by the Union Chief Engineer,
Brigadier General Comstock, who provided his recommendations to General
Steele. Steele reported that the Confederate works were strong,
about two miles in extent, composed of redoubts constructed of earth and timber, with
ditches in front, which redoubts were connected by continuous rifle pits, with salients and
stockade work, making a continuous line from the enemy's left, on Tensaw River, to his
right, which rested on impassable swamp and thicket.

7

Ibid., 224-225.
U.S War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880 -1901; reprint
by Historical Times Inc., 1985), ser. I, vol. 49, pt. 1, 87-91 (hereinafter cited as OR).

8
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The obstructions placed in front of the Confederate main line were also quite
impressive as Steele reported that,
There were two continuous lines of abatis around the works, and at some points three.
Outside of these were rifle pits for sharpshooters…The timber was slashed in front of the
works for about 1,000 yards, and the character of the ground such as to require the
construction of approaches.

At the time of their initial observations, Comstock and Steele could not see the
hidden trip lines made from telegraph wire, and the buried land mines (called subterra shells) that also formed part of the obstructions in front of the Confederate
main line of works.

9

The first order of business was the selection of artillery sites, which was
accomplished by engineering officers, Captain A. H. Burnham and Captain E. H
Newton on staff to General Steele. Construction of these batteries and the Union
first line of entrenchments began immediately, with improvements and
advancements being accomplished continuously up until the final assault on April
9th. Each of the four division commanders commended the bravery of their troops
during the final assault, but much of their highest praise was reserved for the
industry and hard labor expended by their troops in working around the clock to
advance their entrenchments while under fire of the Confederate sharpshooters
and artillery. Typical was the report of Brigadier General John P. Hawkins, whose
three brigades of U. S. Colored Troops held the extreme right of the Union line,
"From the 2d to the 9th instant the troops were busy night and day making
approaches toward the place, all this time under a heavy fire from the fort and from
the gun-boats of the enemy." This labor was especially hard on Hawkins' troops
9

OR, ser. I, vol. 49, pt. 1, 282-3.
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because they had not had time to recover from the debilitating effects of their tenday march to Blakely, "The march was a severe one on the men, being attended
with constant labor, making corduroy roads to get the wagons through the almost
impassable swamps." Although Hawkins had two regiments of engineer troops, he
had no engineering officers assigned to his division and had to depend on Captain
Newton of General Steele's staff to provide technical direction on the construction
of his entrenchments and artillery batteries.

10

Brigadier General C. C. Andrews' division was positioned just to the left of
Hawkins, and he too, was impressed with the work of his troops, stating in his
report that "the two brigades of my division have dug 5571 yards (in excess of 3
miles) of rifle-pits and approaches in the seven days preceding the assault." The
division of Brigadier General James C. Veatch was positioned to the left of
Andrews at Blakely, and like Andrews' division, was part of the Thirteenth Army
Corps whose chief engineer, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Palfrey, reported that
construction of Veatch's entrenchments at Blakely were directed by Captain W. J.
Edwards, assistant engineer of the division. Palfrey's report also provides details
of factors that impeded construction of the Federals’ earthworks; they lacked a
"sufficient number of trained and experienced assistant engineers" placing a
severe burden on the few they had and greatly delaying the work. They had no
"sapper troops" which referred to regiments of "miners and sappers" that were
dedicated to construction of approaches to the enemy’s works, meaning that
Veatch’s combat troops had to perform these exhausting duties, which drained
10

OR, ser. I, vol. 49, pt. 1, 286-7.
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their energy and was "highly injurious to the army." Also impeding the work,
according to Palfrey, was the want of any systematic method for "procuring,
issuing and accounting for siege tools and material."

11

The division of Brigadier General Kenner Garrard occupied the far left of the
Union line where the swampy creek bottoms prevented the establishment and
advancement of conventional siege lines. Some advanced skirmishers were able
to entrench in small rifle pits within 600 yards of the Confederate line, but these
were on low ground that was commanded by Confederate artillery. Most of
Garrard's troops had to advance about 1000 yards through the swampy creek
bottoms during the final assault on the 9th. Their success may have been due to
the fact that old men and young boys with little or no training manned the
Confederate line at this point. The relatively low casualty numbers of Garrard's and
Veatch's divisions provides evidence of the weaker resistance provided by the
green Alabama recruits that occupied the Confederate line from redoubt no. 5 to
redoubt no. 9. On the final assault, these two Union divisions sustained only forty
percent of the Union casualties although they attacked roughly fifty-six percent
(five-ninths) of the Confederate line. In comparison, the Confederate line from
redoubt no. 1 to no. 4 was manned by veteran Missouri and Mississippi troops.
Here the combined divisions of General Andrews and General Hawkins sustained
sixty percent of the Union casualties even though they attacked only forty-four
percent (four-ninths) of the Confederate fortifications.

11
12

OR, ser. I, vol. 49, pt. 1, 149, 205.
Ibid., 101-102.
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In spite of the success of Garrard's division, General Andrews criticized him
in his post-war book for not bridging the Bay Minette swamp on his extreme left in
order to completely occupy all land approaches to the Confederate position.
Surprisingly, Garrard's troops also captured the Fort Blakely commander, Brigadier
General St. John R. Liddell, at this position on the extreme southern end of the
Confederate line. One would think that a commander would choose a central
location from which to direct the operations of his army or at least seek protection
behind his strongest troops. As it turned out, Liddell had moved his quarters near
redoubt no. 9 on the morning of April 9th because he was concerned that the
muddy tracks through the swamp, left by the garrison from Spanish Fort the night
before, could be used by the enemy to lead them to a point behind the
Confederate line. He move his quarters to the southern end of the line so he could
better direct efforts to seal up this unforeseen hole in their defensive
fortifications. 13

Accounts of Union Soldiers
Accounts of the siege and battle of Fort Blakely are moderately abundant in
the letters, diaries and post-war reminisces of individual Union soldiers. A few of
these are preserved in the Civil War manuscript archives at The Museum of
Mobile, most of which make mention of the underground torpedoes that the
Confederates placed in front of their works, sometimes producing horrible maiming
of the attackers. One Union soldier, John H. Gregory, related in a letter that his
13
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fellow soldiers were so incensed by this practice they "took no prisoners but killed
every soul of them." Another letter writer named Edward reported his unit took
similar action when, during the final assault, the Confederate defenders raised
white flags to stop the Union fire only to resume firing when the attackers got
closer. Edward also reported that when the regiments of U. S. Colored Troops on
the right of the Union line overtook the Confederate works, "it was hard work to
keep them from killing the prisoners, they would not take any themselves."

14

Elias Moore of the 114th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, wrote to his mother with a
vivid account of the final assault at Blakely, which letter also contained detailed
descriptions of the obstructions the Confederates had placed in front of their main
line of fortifications,
We had to travel over a distance of about four hundred yards, across a deep hollow. This
space had been covered by a dense growth of pine, which had been felled with the tops
pointing towards us, and the limbs cut and sharpened. This was very difficult to pass over.
Within fifty yards of their works they had constructed a thick brush fence, limbs sharpened
and pointing outward. Inside of this was a line of inclined pickets planted in the ground and
about breast high, these were also sharpened. There were openings left at certain spaces,
and along the paths through these, they had torpedoes planted. About four feet in front of
the ditch surrounding the main works they had a wire stretched about ankle high, which
sent many a soldier on his head into the ditch.

Moore also related the fate of the Confederate soldiers as their defensive line
collapsed, and how the Confederates that faced the U.S. Colored Troops ran to
nearby white Union troops for protection, but many "were bayoneted or shot." He
also repeated stories he had heard about how "the negroes bayoneted and
clubbed the rebels in their possession in Mobile." Most gruesome, however, were
the graphic descriptions Moore gave of the injuries sustained by Union soldiers
14
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who had the misfortune of stepping on one of the Confederates' underground
torpedoes. Moore's feelings about these injuries were undoubtedly shared by
many,
"This kind of warfare is nothing short of cold blooded murder. I would like to see the fiend
who ordered them put in the ground, hung, shot, or burnt. There is no death too severe, no
torture sufficient to retaliate for the murder of our brave boys." 15

Primary Confederate Sources
The Official Records and Letters and Telegrams Sent
Although amply endowed with Union reports, the Official Records does not
contain any post-battle reports from Confederate commanders who participated in
the siege and battle of Blakely. What it does contain, however, are reports and
letters from Confederate commanders and engineering officers, written in the
preceding months, which provide a detailed and informative timeline of the design
and construction of Confederate fortifications at Blakely. Supplementing these
sources are engineering and command correspondence preserved in “Letters and
Telegrams Sent by the Engineer Bureau of the Confederate War Department,
1861-1864,” part of Record Group 109 at the National Archives. From these
sources, the time sequence of events relative to the construction and use of
Confederate fortifications at Blakely can be formulated as presented in Appendix A
herein. This historical timeline documents the basic facts and events that surround
the development and use of Fort Blakely during the closing months of the Civil
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War. The historical research that formed the basis for the Fort Blakely timeline of
Appendix A also formed the research foundation for the historical essay presented
in Chapter Five.

Liddell's Record
The published post-war writings of the Fort Blakely commander, Brigadier
General St. John R. Liddell, are contained in a commented collection of his
writings entitled Liddell’s Record. Liddell's account of the siege and battle of Fort
Blakely was written in 1867, only two years after the event, and is notable mainly
for its extreme brevity, comprising barely two pages. He stated that the number of
his troops was completely inadequate to defend his works successfully against the
Union attackers, but that if he had been allowed to retain the evacuated Spanish
Fort garrison, which General Maury ordered to Mobile, he could have repulsed the
Union assault. Liddell does not blame General Maury for his defeat, however, but
commends Maury for doing everything possible with the resources that he had.
Liddell's reluctance to provide the details of a humiliating defeat is understandable,
yet his leadership of the Confederate forces at Blakely is often lauded and seldom
criticized. The editor of Liddell's Record, for example, commends Liddell's active
involvement in directing naval support for his troops at Blakely, which by all
accounts was highly effective.

16
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St. John R. Liddell and Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Liddell’s Record (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1997), 195-196; OR, ser. I, vol. 49, pt. 1, 319-322.

23

General Dabney Maury's Account of the Defense of Mobile
Written in 1871 as a delayed report to former-President Jefferson Davis,
and published in 1877 in The Southern Historical Society Papers, Major General
Maury's account of the defense of Spanish Fort and of Fort Blakely is fairly
detailed but provides no new information with the exception of his revelation that
the Union ironclad Tecumseh was probably sunk by its own torpedo while trying to
run past the guns of Fort Morgan on August 5, 1864. At the time of its sinking,
there was much discussion and argument over whether Tecumseh had been sunk
by an underwater torpedo or by artillery fire from Fort Morgan. The Confederates
had left a narrow channel, close to shore, free of torpedoes so that blockaderunners could pass by Fort Morgan, believing that no enemy ship could withstand
the artillery fire from the fort at almost point-blank range. Some said that
Tecumseh sank so fast it could not possibly have been due to artillery fire, which
penetrates a ship above the water line resulting in a slower sinking rate or even no
sinking at all. Others argued that there were no torpedoes in the part of the
shipping channel the Tecumseh occupied; therefore it had to have been sunk by
cannon fire. Maury reveals that the Tecumseh itself was outfitted with a torpedo
affixed to a twenty-foot long wooden spar attached to its bow with the intention to
ram the torpedo into the Confederate ironclad Tennessee, which was its most
formidable adversary. According to Maury, when artillery fire from Fort Morgan
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broke the torpedo loose from its spar, it passed underneath the ship, contacting
the ship's hull with devastating results causing the ship to sink almost instantly.

17

Maury's published remarks are also valuable because he documented the
extensive use of emerging technology in the defense of Mobile. Maury claims that
a total of twelve Union ships, including the Tecumseh, were sunk by torpedoes in
Mobile Bay, a fact which demonstrated to the navies of the world that the muchherald “ironclad” ship design had serious vulnerabilities and that almost any harbor
or waterway could be protected from invasion by an enemy naval force by using
underwater torpedoes. He also described other innovative devices used at
Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely including one-half inch thick iron screens or plates
used to plug the embrasures or openings through which artillery was fired. The
innovation was the device that enabled the armor-plate to be raised or lowered
quickly when needed, offering the gun crews much needed protection from rifle fire
while they serviced and reloaded their artillery pieces. Another innovation was
credited to Colonel William E. Burnett of Texas (killed at Spanish Fort while he and
Maury were inspecting the lines) who had devised a much-simplified mechanism
by which the heaviest cannon could be run into battery using only one hand.
Maury documents the use of "Beauregard screens" which were a type of wooden
embrasure used by sharpshooters in rifle pits. Devised by General Beauregard,
they were secured in place with sand bags and were deemed much superior to

17
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head logs, so much so that Maury claimed, "the demand for them was soon
greater than I could supply."

18

Accounts By Confederate Soldiers
Accounts of the siege and battle of Fort Blakely by Confederate soldiers are
not quite as numerous as those of Union soldiers; however, some first-hand
accounts from Missouri soldiers are quoted in Phil Gottschalk's In Deadly Earnest:
The Missouri Brigade. The Missourians occupied the left-center of the Confederate
line beginning with redoubt no. 3 and extending past redoubt no. 4, and their
accounts deal primarily with the fighting in and around these two forts. Lieutenant
O. F. Guthrie paid tribute to the design and construction of the Confederate
fortifications, describing redoubt no. 4 as "the best works we ever fought behind
with nice head logs and a battery on each flank." Second Lieutenant E. W. Tarrant
was an artillerist whose unit manned guns in redoubt nos. 1 and 2 (which were
defended by Mississippi infantry regiments), and he described events that
transpired when the U. S. Colored Troops overran those two forts. He saw one
Confederate officer "shot down" and another soldier "clubbed to the ground" after
surrendering. The officers of the Colored Troops regained control, however, and
"there were no other outrages."

19

Lieutenant Alden McClellan, another artillerist at Blakely, recorded his
experiences in a Confederate Veteran magazine article. At the time of the final
18
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Union assault on April 9th, McClellan was assisting with a surgery in the hospital,
however, as soon as he finished he tried to escape to the waterfront but was
captured and taken prisoner. His article is mainly a description of his experiences
as a prisoner, first taken to Mobile then transferred to the federal prison at Ship
Island, Mississippi, eventually taken to New Orleans and then finally to Vicksburg
where he was paroled. His worst experiences of hardship and abuse occurred
while imprisoned at Ship Island, which became especially harsh upon the
announcement of President Lincoln's assassination.

20

The atrocities committed by the black Union troops against the Confederate
soldiers at Blakely were reported by both Union and Confederate eyewitnesses
and were inflicted in retribution for like atrocities reported to have been committed
by Confederates against black Union troops and their white officers during the last
two years of the war. Confederates viewed black Union soldiers, most of whom
were ex-slaves, as traitors to the South who had turned on their southern
“benefactors”. Southerners also believed that northern leaders were attempting to
foment slave insurrections in the South by their use of black troops, which resulted
in an increased loathing toward the Yankee officers who led black soldiers into
battle. The most infamous and widely reported incident of the Civil War occurred at
Fort Pillow, Tennessee in April of 1864 when Confederate troops under General
Nathan Bedford Forrest killed a large number of U. S. Colored Troops and some of
their white officers after eyewitnesses said they had surrendered. One year later at
Fort Blakely, “Remember Fort Pillow” became the rallying cry of the black troops
20
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as they charged the Confederate fortifications, and like the Confederates at Fort
Pillow, the gave no quarter to the enemy.

21

Secondary Sources
As previously mentioned, many of the secondary sources dealing with
Mobile concentrate on the Naval battle of 1864 providing little information on the
eastern shore battles of 1865. A notable exception is Confederate Mobile by
Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr. This work is a comprehensive account based largely on
primary sources, and it provides a balanced narrative encompassing land
operations, naval operations, the role played by engineers, the command strategy
of sides, as well as the interaction between the Confederate military and the local
population. If one had to choose a single work with which to become familiar with
Mobile military operations during the Civil War, this would be the one to choose.
Other works dealing with both army and navy operations at Mobile, such as Mobile
Bay and the Mobile Campaign by Chester G. Hearn, simply do not measure up to
Bergeron's high standard of historical research. For example, Hearn attributes the
design of Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely to Mobile Chief Engineer Danville
Leadbetter. This seems unlikely, since General Leadbetter left Mobile in October
of 1863 to become Beauregard's Chief Engineer at Chattanooga, and the plans for
fortifications at Blakely and Spanish Fort were begun only after the Union fleet
took control of Mobile Bay in August of 1864. Even though Leadbetter had
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withdrawn from active service at some point, possibly due to health reasons, and
was living in Mobile in August 1864, he is never mentioned in any of the
Engineering reports originating in Mobile between August 1864 and the end of the
war. When the Union fleet began forming off the Alabama coast in June 1864, the
Engineer Bureau did not know Leadbetter’s whereabouts, but after learning from
Lt. Col. Viktor von Sheliha that he was living in Mobile, the Bureau telegraphed
Leadbetter in August 1864 asking him to assist General Maury in any way that he
could. No evidence could be found that he provided such assistance. 22

Technical Sources
A Treatise on Field Fortifications
During the Civil War the majority of field fortifications were constructed in
accordance with a design manual authored by a West Point engineering professor,
Colonel Dennis Hart Mahan. Entitled A Treatise on Field Fortifications, Containing
Instructions on the Method of Laying Out, Constructing, Defending, and Attacking
Intrenchments, with the General Outlines, the manual was comprehensive in its
coverage and included many illustrations. This manual, which is still published in
reprint editions, provides insight into why Civil War earthworks were designed the
way they were and how their weakness were exploited by the enemy. Mahan’s
manual primarily addressed field fortifications, made of earth and timber and
22
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constructed in the field by soldiers or unskilled laborers, as opposed to permanent
fortifications made of brick, stone and mortar and constructed by skilled laborers.
Also differing in design and purpose, according to Mahan, were the earthworks
constructed by entrenched defenders versus those constructed by attacking or
besieging forces. These differences are examined further in Chapter Four. 23

Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War
Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 18611864 by Earl J. Hess provides an excellent description of the tactical use and
design of Civil War field fortifications based on the author's examination of
hundreds of Civil War fortifications over a period of many years. Although the
author focuses specifically on fortifications used in the Eastern campaigns from
1861 to 1864, his coverage of fieldworks in general is quite comprehensive
explaining in detail how design features evolved over the course of the war and
how the Civil War gave birth to innovations in the design and tactical use of
fieldworks. For anyone planning personal examination of Civil War earthworks,
Hess's book is highly recommended. General topics covered include: who initiated
construction of fieldworks, who designed them, who constructed them, the theory,
the design and the doctrine of fieldworks and how these changed during the
course of the Civil War, the role played by the Engineering Corps of both sides,
the influence of Dennis H. Mahan on the design and doctrine of Civil War
23
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fieldworks, the design and use of underground torpedoes, and an extensive
glossary of fortification terminology.
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CHAPTER 3: PROJECT METHODOLOGY
Step-By-Step Process
The creation of accurate geo-location maps of the existing earthworks at
Blakeley Historic Park was a three-step process. The first step was the
accumulation of Global Positioning System survey files using a handheld receiver
to collect the survey data. The handheld receiver that I used was a Trimble GeoXT
model that incorporated a micro-processor using a Windows operating system and
TerraSync data-logging software. It produced survey data having an advertised
geodetic accuracy ranging from one to three feet when using the real-time
differential correction capability. Survey files were created by walking along a line
of earthworks while capturing survey coordinates at the principal points needed to
define the shape or outline of the earthwork. Although the density of the forest
cover, as well as the current position of Global Positioning System satellites, can
affect the accuracy of the readings, there are techniques, such as the averaging of
several readings taken in the same location, which can compensate for this
problem. In my case, I chose to program the handheld receiver to collect data only
under conditions of guaranteed accuracy. This ensured that all survey data
collected was within the advertised one-to-three foot accuracy. The disadvantage
of this approach was that I was often unable to collect survey data, either due to
heavy forest cover or due to less-than-optimum satellite positioning.
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The second step of the process is to have the Global Positioning System
survey data "post-processed" using special Global Positioning System software or
by using the post-processing services offered by the U.S. Geological Survey
office. The processing provides corrections to errors induced by satellite
positioning, clocking issues, and atmospheric effects. I was able to by-pass this
step by programming the Global Positioning System receiver to collect data only
when the Wide Area Augmentation Satellite was in view. This system uses
strategically located ground stations to identify and correct the differential errors
real-time thus eliminating the need for post-processing.
The third step was to combine the recorded mapping data with an existing
digital map of the area using a Geographic Information System software
application, such as ArcView or ArcGis. Digital maps that have been created using
standard geodetic reference datums are readily available from several federal,
state and commercial sources. These can be topographical maps as shown in
Figure 3, or even digital orthophoto quadrangle maps as shown in Figure 4. Both
types are available from the U.S. Geological Survey website. The digital
orthophoto quadrangle maps are created using the process of orthorectification,
which removes most of the feature displacements and scale variations caused by
terrain relief and sensor position. The result combines the image characteristics of
a photograph with the geometric qualities of a map.
Once I combined the Global Positioning System mapping data on a digital
map using the ArcView 3.3 software application, I then used the drawing functions
of the software to add symbols, graphics, text, a scale legend, and a North
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Map Courtesy of US Geological Survey

Figure 3. Sample Topographical Map

Image Courtesy of US Geological Survey

Figure 4. Sample Digital Orthophoto Quadrangle Map
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indicator to the map. The end product was saved as an ArcView layout and as a
JPEG file and printed as a hard copy also. The entire process of creating the map,
from capturing the Global Positioning System coordinate data to plotting the final
map was accomplished using procedures and mapping software recommended by
Dr. Tarig Ali of the UCF Engineering Technology Department, and using the
frequent technical advice given by Mr. David Holt and Mr. James Robeson, both of
GPServ Inc.

Challenges
While working on this project, I encountered several problems that were, for
the most part, unanticipated. The first of these had to do with the difficulties of
achieving access to the earthworks that I was attempting to map. The terrain at
Blakeley Park is very hilly with hilltops separated by deep ravines and flowing
creeks, and in some cases by swampy lowlands. Initially I had easy going because
I surveyed the Confederate line of fortifications from redoubt no. 4 to redoubt no.
9, which anchors the southern end of the Confederate earthworks. For these
earthworks, the park maintains a walking trail along the parapet of the breastworks
and there are boardwalks across the creeks and lowlands, and even wooden
steps where the inclines are steep. Occasionally one has to step over a dead tree
that has fallen across the path, but that is the most serious obstacle one
encounters. Gaining access to Union earthworks, however, is a completely
different proposition in most instances. The lone exception is the Union lines
immediately opposite Confederate redoubt no. 4, where the land between the
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opposing lines has been cleared and is maintained in that state. Elsewhere, the
Union earthworks are located either in heavily forested areas or in areas that have
been logged recently (within the last five years). One would think that earthworks
located in recently logged areas would be easiest to find, but I found this not to be
the case. Logging operations remove most of the forest cover resulting in an
extremely thick growth of underbrush and briars, which impedes searching on foot
and also obscures the trenches from view. A third effect of logging is the flattening
of the rifle trenches by the logging vehicle traffic, which further reduces their visual
profile. Because of the difficulty in accessing the Union earthworks, I was able to
find and map only a very small portion of them. In order to find them in most cases
required being guided to them by a park ranger who had actually seen them
before, and even then it sometimes took hours to find them. Once found, their
mapping was also difficult due to the density of vegetation.
A second problem that I encountered was one associated with Global
Positioning System satellite positions in the sky and how that affected my ability to
collect accurate survey data. I found that satellite positioning was most favorable
early in the morning and that it deteriorated as the day progressed. This problem
was made worse by the forest cover and the hilly terrain to the extent that I could
only collect survey data in the morning hours if I was in forest cover, and even
then, if I was on the side of a hill that blocked line-of sight to one or more satellites,
I could not collect accurate survey data. Only in a few cases was I able to collect
survey data in the afternoon, usually when there was little or no forest cover.
When the satellites were more nearly directly overhead their signal easily
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penetrated the forest cover. However, when located nearer the horizon, their
signal was blocked by the increased thickness of the forest cover due to the
shallow penetration angle of the signal.
A third challenge had to do with the merging of my survey data with a
purchased digital orthophoto quadrangle map. I chose to purchase a digital
orthophoto quadrangle map from an online digital map supplier because the map
was based on more accurate and more recent aerial photography and at a less
expensive price that that of comparable maps available from Alabama State
agencies. Accompanying the digital orthophoto quadrangle maps were text files
(called "world" files) that contain information used by GIS mapping software to
align the photographic map with the appropriate geodetic reference datum. In my
case, one of the "world" files provided with the map had an error in it that
prevented the proper alignment of the map with my survey data. It took me several
days to figure out the problem and to correct it so that everything was in alignment.
If I had purchased my maps from say, Baldwin County, Alabama at ten times the
price I paid, I might have received "world” files that had been created with more
care and therefore free of errors.
I have summarized the most serious of the problems encountered; however, there
were many smaller challenges that impacted my day-to-day progress. Readers
contemplating a similar project may be interested in more details, so I have
included a copy of my daily journal, as Appendix B, in the hope that it might be
helpful.
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CHAPTER 4: PROJECT FINDINGS
My examination of the Blakeley earthworks at confirmed that the designs of
these field fortifications conformed to guidelines published in Dennis Mahan's
design manual. Also established was the fact that the Confederate advanced rifle
pits, in some cases, were over three hundred yards from the Confederate main
line - a fact reported in some of the first hand accounts of the battle as having
contributed to the Confederate defeat. The mapping project also produced
evidence that resolved uncertainties related to the exact location of Confederate
redoubt no. 3 and whether or not it is located on park owned property. In addition, I
was able to establish how the sketches in the journal of Confederate engineer Lt.
Maurice Garland were related to the design of the fortifications at Blakely. Finally, I
was able to examine earthworks at many different locations within the park and to
observe how their condition is being affected by the elements and also by various
activities within the park.

Mapping Results
An overview of the mapping I performed is shown in Figure 5, and copies of
all the maps that I created and provided to Blakeley Park are attached in Appendix
C. Once I had created a map in the ArcView mapping application, I was easily able
to measure distances on the map or distances between visible features. I used
this capability of the software to establish the extent of both the Confederate an
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Figure 5. Overview of Blakeley Mapping
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the Union earthworks. The crescent shaped Confederate line of nine redoubts
connected by rifle pits was 3,500 yards (2 miles) long from its northern end on a
bluff overlooking the Tensaw River to its southern end anchored on a bluff at the
edge of the Bay Minette swamp. Even though I was unable to locate and map
redoubt no. 1, I used historical mapping information to establish its approximate
location. The initial Union line (1st parallel) extended for 6,300 yards (3.6 miles)
from its northern end to its southern end at the Bluff Battery. I located and mapped
these extreme northern and southern ends of the Union line, which were 2.6 miles
apart measured as the crow flies.
The overview map in Figure 5 clearly shows that Confederate redoubt no. 3
is not located on park property. There are actually two remaining vestiges of
redoubt no. 3. The northern portion is located on a vacant residential lot, which
was so grown over with brush that it, too, was difficult to map. The southern
portion of redoubt no. 3 that remains is a small redan located on a 50 acre
privately owned parcel of land adjoining park property. Park Ranger Thomas
Harms and I found it one afternoon, but I was unable to map it due to poor satellite
positioning and the forest cover. According to the marked boundary line (trees with
a swatch of blue painted on the trunk) the redan was not on park property, but it
was close enough that it would be worth having a surveyor check its location
against the recorded boundary lines. The property owner might also be willing to
sell or donate to the park the small parcel containing the redan.
One of the redans of Confederate redoubt no. 2 is also preserved on
property owned by Mr. Joe Wilson, who graciously allowed me to examine it and
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to collect mapping data. Whether anything still exists of redoubt no. 1 remains a
mystery. There is a house on the bluff just north of redoubt no. 2 where it is said
that redoubt no. 1 was located, but local tradition holds that it was destroyed by
the clearing and leveling of the lot prior to building the house. Mrs. Trueblood, the
owner of the house, denied my request to examine remains of earthworks on her
property, however, her son had told me earlier that the property contained remains
of some rifle pits, and also that a soldier and a cannon were buried on the
property, the location of which had been revealed to him by Mr. Trueblood, his
stepfather, just before he died. My examination of historic maps of the battlefield
leads me to believe that most of redoubt no. 1, or at least a significant portion of it
was located north of the Trueblood property. I have indicated this area by a
dashed box on the map shown in Figure 5.

Union Siege lines
When the Union forces arrived in front of Fort Blakely on April 2, 1865, the
Confederate artillery fire was quite effective, forcing Union commanders to
commence siege operations instead of launching an outright attack. Siege tactics
involved first surrounding the enemy’s works to prevent all entering and exiting,
and then establishing a line of rifle trenches, called the first parallel, directly
opposite the enemy works. Mahan's design manual recommended digging of the
first parallel about 600 yards from the enemy's line, and supporting this line with
artillery batteries spaced at strategic locations. Excavation of the trenches was
usually performed under the cover of darkness since it was done well within range
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of the enemy's artillery. When trenches of the first parallel were completed, new
trenches were begun in the direction of the enemy, and when these trenches,
called saps, had been advanced by 100 to 300 yards, a second parallel was
begun starting from the ends of the saps. In this manner a whole series of parallels
could be constructed, until troops were as close as sixty yards from the enemy's
line, and from this point an attack could be launched if so desired. In the case of
the siege of Blakely, three parallels were constructed by the Union troops, and the
final attack was launched from the third parallel, which was 300 yards from the
Confederate line at its closest point and about 700 yards from the Confederate line
at its most distant point.
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My mapping of the Union rifle trenches was admittedly spotty and
consequently did not reveal a true picture of the Union's extensive network of
trenches. The U.S. Geological Survey department mapped the Union trenches
located on the northeast part of the battlefield in 1940, and this map provides the
best illustration of the Union siege lines. A portion of the 1940 U.S. Geological
Survey map is shown in Figure 6, and one can clearly see the three separate
parallels and the connecting saps that were used to advance the parallels. Also
noteworthy is the fact that the first parallel was about one thousand yards from the
Confederate line and not six hundred yards as Mahan recommended. The reason
for this was that the artillery fire from the northern end of the Confederate line was
augmented very effectively by fire from the Confederate gunboats that sat at the
head of the Raft River and lobbed their shells into the Union lines about one mile
25
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distant. Even the third parallel at the northern end of the line was no closer than
700 yards from the Confederate line, giving the U. S. Colored Troops that manned
this part of the Union line a lot of ground to cover during the final attack on April
9th.

Base Map Courtesy of US Geological Survey

Figure 6. Union Siege Lines
Also noteworthy on the U.S. Geological Survey map is the lack of
Confederate earthworks that are shown at the north end of the battlefield
compared to the somewhat detailed mapping of the Union earthworks. To
compensate for this lack, I have drawn in Figure 6 the approximate location of the
Confederate line by combining my limited mapping data in this area with
information contained on the 1865 and the 1940 historical maps. Mapping of the
Confederate earthworks in 1940 was probably hampered by circumstances similar
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to those that hampered me - that is the residential nature of the local area with
multiple landowners who are reluctant to grant access for various reasons. The
Union trenches, in contrast, probably lay on undeveloped land that afforded easy
access.

Union and Confederate Field Fortification Design Differences
The Union trenches and artillery batteries conformed to the basic designs
proposed by Dennis Mahan as did the Confederate fortifications; however, there
were differences in the earthworks constructed by the two opposing forces. The
Union rifle pits generally took the design illustrated in Figure 7. A trench was
excavated and the earth was thrown up in front of the trench so the soldier
occupying the trench was partially submerged below ground level and partially
protected by the mound of earth in front of the trench. The Union soldiers
themselves constructed these rifle pits in a matter of hours, whereas the more
substantial Confederate earthworks were constructed over a period of weeks and
months using mostly slave labor plus the forced labor of captured U.S. Colored
Troops.
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The Confederate breastworks generally took the design that is also
illustrated in Figure 7, consisting of a ditch in front and a mound of earth that was
raised using the soil excavated from the ditch. Beginning in mid-1863 both sides
began placing head logs atop the parapet of their works with slots made in them or
below them for soldiers to fire their rifles through. It was found that these head logs
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provided superior protection compared to earth alone. As quoted in a previous
chapter, a Missouri soldier who helped defend Confederate redoubt no. 4 stated
that the fortifications at Blakely "were the best works we ever fought behind with
nice head logs and a battery on each flank." The walls of the Confederate
redoubts were built higher than those of the connecting breastworks to provide

Illustration by Dwight K. Johnson

Figure 7. Earthworks Design
added protection to the gun crews operating within the redoubts. In these cases, a
ledge on the interior wall had to be constructed for the riflemen to stand on as
illustrated in Figure 8. There was a practical limit to how high these walls could be
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built, however, due to the fact they were constructed using only pick and shovel.
Mahan recommends the height of the parapet of field fortifications be at least eight
feet high but no more than twelve feet since that was the upper limit of the height
that earth could be thrown by a man. The exterior ditch, according to Mahan,
should be six to twelve feet deep and at least twenty feet wide.
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Illustration by Dwight K. Johnson

Figure 8. Redoubt and Battery Design
Union Brigadier General C.C. Andrews reported the depth of the
Confederate ditches at Fort Blakely to be only four to five feet. This fairly shallow
depth probably was due to the layer of hard clay that lies below the sandy loam
topsoil at Blakeley. Evidence suggests that the topsoil was especially thin on the
northern end of the battlefield. One Union General ordered more picks for use by
his troops saying the ground was hard and that "the shovel is a poor instrument
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without a greater number of picks to assist it." The Confederate engineers also
reported construction of a "sunken" battery at redoubt no. 1, which was the
northern-most Confederate redoubt. Sunken batteries were constructed in
circumstances where the exterior ditch could not provide sufficient earth for the
walls, so the required earth was taken from inside the work making the interior
floor below ground level.
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Design of Confederate Redoubts
The Confederate redoubts were designed as multiple "redans", the majority of
them being triple redans. The redan was a simple fort design consisting of two
faces joined at one end to form a salient angle of no less than sixty degrees. The
fort was open at the rear since it was designed to protect an object or a location in
its rear from which direction no attack was anticipated. Embrasures for cannon
were usually constructed in the faces of the redan, and a fort consisting of multiple
redans was considered much superior to one comprised of only a single redan.
The reason for this can be easily illustrated by looking at the map of Confederate
redoubt no. 5 as shown in Figure 9. First consider only the center redan of the
redoubt, and it can be seen that the field of fire from cannon located in each face
results in a coverage pattern that leaves an unprotected avenue of approach for
the enemy located directly in front of the salient angle. The most effective way to
correct this deficiency was to construct adjacent redans that provided coverage of
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Illustration by Dwight K. Johnson

Figure 9. Single Redan Field-of-Fire - Redoubt No. 5
the unprotected zone as shown in Figure 10. Thus, multiple redans were mutually
supporting with each protecting the "dead" zone in the other's field of fire. Also
noteworthy in the construction of redoubt no. 5, was the use of "traverses" to
protect the gun crews from enfilading fire. Traverses were parapets thrown up at
right angles to the main line of fortification to protect the occupants from enfilading
fire (enemy fire from the side), and they provide added evidence of the
evolutionary nature of fortification design as the war progressed. Traverses were
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not used at the beginning of the war, but evidence indicates that they were first
used in the fall of 1861 and became commonplace by mid-1863.

29

Illustration by Dwight K. Johnson

Figure 10. Field-of-Fire for Adjacent Redans - Redoubt No. 5
Confederate Design Flaws
Several first hand accounts of the final attack at Fort Blakely provide
surprising evidence that Confederate tactics making use of their advanced rifle pits
were flawed and contributed to their defeat. The Confederates had constructed
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two lines of advanced rifle pits; the first line well over 200 yards in advance of their
main line, and a second line of pits that was over 300 yards in advance of the main
line. These advanced rifle pits can be clearly seen in the map of the battlefield
between Confederate redoubt no. 4 and the Union third parallel near the 115th
Massachusetts battery. The map shown in Figure 11 indicates that some of the
Confederate advanced rifle pits were 340 yards in advance of the main line. This
figure also shows some Union advanced rifle pits and a Union sap, which was
started near the 115th Massachusetts Battery and had been advanced about 100
yards toward the Confederate line. Each rifle pit was a crescent shaped trench
with a mound of dirt in front and each could accommodate a maximum of about six
riflemen. The purpose of the advanced rifle pits of the Confederates was to
impede the advance of the Union lines, but the placement of these soldiers so far
in front of the main line proved to be a serious error when the final Union attack
came.
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Map by Dwight K. Johnson

Figure 11. Advanced Rifle Pits
30

Andrews, 224; OR, ser. I, vol. 49, pt. I, 216.

50

The ground immediately in front of the Confederate line was filled with
obstructions designed to slow an attacker so that he could more easily be picked
off by rifle fire. The obstructions included at least two lines of abatis, tripwires
made from telegraph lines and "sub-terra shells" or land mines as they are called
today. When the final Union attack was launched, Confederates in the advanced
rifle pits had to beat a hasty retreat, but they, too, were slowed by the obstructions
and effectively shielded the attackers from the fire of the main line as the attacking
soldiers entered the obstructions. The Confederates in the main line held their fire
until their retreating comrades were safely inside the works, and by that time the
attackers were upon them. Colonel F.W. Moore of the 83rd Ohio reported that his
men were "close in the footsteps" of the sprinting Confederates. The attacking
federals also had the advantage of superior numbers and with the added
advantage of being shielded by the retreating Confederates they quickly overran
the Confederate line. Placement of the advanced rifle pits say only 50 yards in
front of the main line would have allowed Confederate riflemen to pour deadly fire
into the attackers just as they were reaching the most difficult abatis.
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Examination of a Confederate Engineer’s Journal
At the request of Park Director JoAnn Flirt, part of my project was to
examine the journal of Lieutenant Maurice Garland, an engineer assigned to Fort
Blakely, with the object of determining what part he played in the design and
construction of the Confederate fortifications. Since the park had only a partial
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copy of the journal, I obtained a complete copy from the Alabama Department of
Archives and History and submitted it to examination. I found that the vast majority
of the engineering notes and sketches contained in the journal were notes copied
almost verbatim from Dennis Mahan's design manual on field fortifications. One
page in the journal, however, does contain small drawings of thirteen redoubts
labeled alphabetically as "A", "B", "C", etc. Of the thirteen redoubts only one of
them is a redan as used at Blakely. Nine of them are square or rectangular shaped
redoubts and three are lunettes. Because of the quantity of these redoubts, their
shape, and their alphabetical labeling, they are certainly and definitely not related
to the Blakely fortifications. It is very likely that Lieutenant Garland was working on
the fortifications of the city of Mobile before he was assigned to Blakely, since the
sketches in his journal are more representative of the redoubts used there.
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In addition to a copy of Lt. Garland's journal, the Alabama Department of
Archives and History also provided me with copies of two hand-written orders that
pertained to Lt. Garland. The acting adjutant general at Mobile signed the first
order, and it is dated April 2, 1865. The order directs Lt. Garland to proceed to
Blakely on the steamer Natchez and to report to Lt. E.A. Ford, engineer in charge
at Blakely, for duty. Since Lt. Garland arrived at Blakely on or about the same day
that the Union Army arrived, it is doubtful that he was significantly involved in the
design and construction of the Blakely fortifications. However, the second order
reveals that Lt. Garland did probably get involved with putting some of the finishing
touches on the Blakely fortifications. Colonel Samuel H. Lockett, engineer in
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command at Mobile, signed this second order which was dated April 7, 1865 - only
two days before the final Union assault. The order is addressed to Lt. E.A. Ford,
engineer in charge at Blakely, and reads as follows:
Lieutenant, I wish you to have made by Lt. Garland's squad of Engineer Troops and any
other rough carpenters you can get from Gen. Liddell a large number of chevaux-de-frise.
thus- (hand drawn sketch) To be used on right & left flank of Blakely line and at Huger &
Tracy.

Chevaux-de-frise was a commonly used obstruction, dating from medieval times,
that was placed in front of fortified works. An example is shown in the period
photograph of Figure 12.

Conditional Evaluation of Blakely Earthworks
The present condition of the Civil War earthworks at Blakeley Historic Park
is generally very good. I observed only a few areas where traffic or erosion has
resulted in accelerated decline. The walking trail atop the parapet of the
Confederate earthworks shows advancing erosion in places where it is steeply
sloped, as where it descends into or out of deep ravines. One easily accessible
location where this is occurring is the walking trail leaving redoubt no. 4 toward
redoubt no. 5 as it descends into the ravine that separates the two redoubts. The
clearing of the forest cover around and between redoubt no. 4 and the 115th
Massachusetts Battery has improved visitor enjoyment of the earthworks, but it
has also accelerated erosion due to the elements and due to human and
equestrian traffic, in and on the forts. In order to impede further erosion of the
forts, high priority should be given to stopping the equestrian traffic completely and
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Library of Congress Photograph LC-B811-3206B

Figure 12. Chevaux-de-Frise
to growing a grass cover on the slopes of the earthworks. Some of the slopes
have already eroded to the extent that they are almost vertical as shown in the
photograph of Figure 13. In these cases soil will have to be added to lessen the
slope and to enable grass to grow.
The Union trenches at Blakeley Historic Park are quite extensive but also
they are more isolated and less accessible to the public than are the Confederate
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earthworks, a fact which has served to preserve them very well. There is a
significant long-term threat to these trenches, however, caused by the infrequent
but periodic logging operations, which occur in the park as a means to raise
revenue. As previously described, the Union trenches were less substantial to
begin with than were the Confederate breastworks, and over time their height and
depth has decreased to the point they now offer little impediment to a logging
truck. Whereas the mound of earth in front of a Union trench may have originally
been three feet high, today that height may average only one and one-half feet or
less, and similar dimensions apply to the depth of the trench. In places where
logging vehicles had repeatedly crossed the Union trench, I observed it to be

Photograph Courtesy of Blakeley Historic Park

Figure 13. Redoubt Soil Erosion
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barely discernable - the mound having been reduced in height to about four inches
or so. To minimize this type of damage, it would be highly desirable to map the
exact location of the remaining trenches so that routes for logging equipment and
vehicles can be established beforehand to avoid crossing the trenches as much as
possible. As suggested by the park rangers at Blakeley, the optimum time to
perform the mapping would be immediately after a controlled burn, usually
performed in the January-February time period, when undergrowth has been
removed and accessibility is at its maximum.
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CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL ESSAY
Efforts to Strengthen Mobile’s Defenses Were Defined by Shortages
The last months of the Civil War brought severe shortages throughout the
South; shortages of staple goods, shortages of basic necessities, shortages of
cash and the most serious shortage of all - a shortage of men willing to continue
the fight for the lost cause of the Confederacy. In Mobile, Alabama, civilians and
soldiers alike had spent four years designing and constructing Mobile’s defenses.
Incredibly, by 1865 the city proper was protected by three separate lines of
fortifications that guarded enemy approaches by land. Water approaches to the
city were protected by extensive obstructions including underwater pilings and
explosive torpedoes, and by both shore-based and water-based artillery batteries.
The extensive fortifications guarding land approaches from the west were
considered impregnable, so the Union Army moved to seize and control the
heights overlooking the rivers that emptied into eastern Mobile Bay. Control of
these heights was crucial because they guarded the water route that led to the city
of Mobile itself.
Confederate fortifications at Spanish Fort fell to the Union Army on April 8,
1865, leaving the defense of Mobile hanging by a slim thread. That slender thread
was Fort Blakely located five miles north of Spanish Fort on the bluffs overlooking
the Tensaw River. The key to Mobile lay in the eastern shore rivers whose banks
housed the powerful artillery batteries named Tracy and Huger that were designed
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to annihilate any ships of the enemy's fleet that dared to negotiate past the
obstructions and underwater torpedoes which impeded entry into the rivers from
Mobile Bay. While Confederate fortifications at Spanish Fort were designed to
guard batteries Tracy and Huger from land-based artillery attack, the Blakely
fortifications guarded the heights commanding the Apalachee-Tensaw water route
to Mobile that was used for supply communication with the batteries. Whoever
controlled the heights overlooking the river at Blakely could prevent water traffic on
the Apalachee and Tensaw Rivers, and thus the artillery garrisons at Tracy and
Huger could be denied re-supply of food and ammunition.
Fort Blakely was located on the bluffs of the eastern shore at the head of
the Apalachee River where it diverged from the Tensaw River. The Confederates
labored in the design and construction of fortifications at Blakely for seven months,
making use of the Confederacy's best engineers and the latest in technological
advances in weaponry and field fortification design. All the labor and the expense
and the expertise were insufficient, however, as Confederate efforts at Blakely
ultimately fell victim to the South's most serious shortage. In fact, throughout the
four-year build-up of Mobile's defenses, chief engineers and army commanders
had been plagued with shortages of both men and supplies, and by August of
1864, when the Federal fleet took control of Mobile Bay, the shortages that would
most affect the construction and effective use of the fortifications at Blakely, were
the shortages of engineers and of laborers, and in the end the shortage of soldiers
willing to make the supreme sacrifice for the Confederacy. All the expense, all the
hard labor and all the technical expertise that was expended on Fort Blakely
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proved inadequate to overcome the shortage of troops and the even more critical
shortage of time. The Confederacy had run out of time, and the hard fought Union
victory at Blakely, which produced a humiliating defeat for the Confederates,
proved to be inconsequential, as the war had essentially ended hours before the
final battle, with the surrender of Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia
to Union forces.

Shortage of Engineers
Lt. Colonel Viktor Von Sheliha assumed duties as Chief Engineer at Mobile
in the fall of 1863 having served as an assistant engineer at Mobile since March of
that year. Realizing the immensity of the task before him, Sheliha almost
immediately began efforts to increase his staff. He successfully enlisted the help,
on a temporary basis, of three officers who had the needed engineering skills but
who were permanently assigned to other departments. These officers became
indispensable to Sheliha, and he requested in February 1864 that their temporary
detail to his department be made indefinite - a request that was granted by the
Secretary of War in the following month. One of these officers, Colonel John H.
Gindrat, would, in September 1864, be assigned responsibility for all eastern shore
defenses, which included the construction of fortifications at Blakely and at
Spanish Fort.
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Sheliha's attempts to bolster his staff received a boost in February and
March of 1864 when the commander of the Confederate Engineer Bureau, Major
General Jeremy F. Gilmer, was ordered to inspect the defenses of Mobile.
Although Gilmer approved of the work that Sheliha had performed, he saw that
there remained much to be done before the defenses of Mobile could be
considered complete. Gilmer telegraphed the Bureau’s assistant Chief Engineer,
Lt. Colonel A.L. Rives, with instructions to order to Mobile an engineer officer from
Charleston who was familiar with heavy artillery and siege operations. Rives
adroitly threw this request back in Gilmer's lap, replying with a suggestion that
Gilmer telegraph General Leadbetter to see if he had an officer that could be
spared. Not to be put off so easily, Gilmer fired another telegram to Rives stating
that the need for engineers at Mobile was urgent, and he wanted at least three
engineering officers ordered to that point without delay. Rives quickly appealed to
the Secretary of War arguing that it was impossible to comply with Gilmer's
request without transferring officers engaged in service of equal or greater
importance. However, Rives proposed an alternative solution – he requested the
return to the Engineer Bureau of two officers previously transferred to Brigadier
General Rains for torpedo duty, whom Rives believed could be spared because
they were "not fully occupied by the discharge of the duties to which they have
been assigned by General Rains." This proposal resulted in these two officers
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being assigned to Sheliha at Mobile, and one of them, Lieutenant E.A. Ford, was
eventually put in charge of the construction of fortifications at Blakely.
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Apparently encouraged by General Gilmer's efforts to provide Mobile with
more engineering officers, Sheliha requested Bureau approval in April 1864 to
form a third company of engineers to support the work at Mobile. Sheliha may
have also been emboldened by a highly laudatory Inspector General's report
issued April 13, 1864. The Inspector General had soaring praise for the
fortifications Sheliha had designed; praise which he expressed with unrestrained
accolades, "They evince a scientific proficiency in engineering unsurpassed, if
equaled, by anything on this continent, and are themselves the most eloquent
evidence of the educated skill of the engineer in charge, Lt. Col. Von Sheliha."
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This high praise, however, was insufficiently persuasive as Sheliha's
request for a third Engineer Company was given the bureaucratic run-around
treatment. Gilmer's assistant, Colonel A.L. Rives replied to Sheliha that regulations
allowed only one Engineer Company for every Division or one company for every
12 regiments in cases where there was no Divisional organization. Rives
suggested that General Polk's command had not filled its quota of engineer
companies, and it might be possible for General Leonidas Polk to form an
engineer company and then assign it to duty in Mobile. Rives further suggested
that Sheliha seek the approval and cooperation of his own Departmental Chief
Engineer, Lt. Col. Samuel H. Lockett - a tactful reminder for Sheliha to work within
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his own chain of command. Sheliha perhaps felt justified in by-passing Lockett
with many of his requests since Sheliha had an earlier date-of-rank than Lockett
and thus technically out ranked him.
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Many of Sheliha's numerous requests were denied, but he was a capable
administrator and manager, and he often found ways, through his persistence and
his resourcefulness, to get what he needed. Even so, the record is filled with
disapprovals of his requests. For example; in February 1864 the Engineer Bureau
denied his request for more shovels, in April the Secretary of War denied his
request for an increase in the contract labor rate that he could offer planters willing
to lease out slaves, in August the Surgeon General denied his request for stocks
of tin in the possession of the medical purveyor at Mobile, also in August, General
Gilmer denied his request to have a torpedo boat transferred from Savannah to
Mobile. Even in instances when Sheliha had the force of Army regulations on his
side he sometimes was refused. An example of this occurred in May 1864 when
Sheliha wrote the Engineer Bureau urging that certain expenses for slave
hospitals and quarters and also certain transportation expenses should be jointly
paid his department and the Quarter Master department, as required by
regulations. Colonel Rives replied to Sheliha denying his request on the grounds
that it was "the prevailing custom…that each Dept. should pay its own expenses in
such matters…" and also "on account…of the delays (and) inconveniencies (and)
possibly disputes which would result." Perhaps the Engineer Bureau grew weary
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of Sheliha's incessant requests for almost everything imaginable and used any
reasonable excuse to escape having to expend their valuable time trying to satisfy
them.
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Sheliha soon received engineering assistance from a source that he had
not anticipated, and under circumstances that he probably would have preferred to
avoid. By the summer of 1864 with the Federal fleet sitting off the coast of
Alabama, he was under tremendous pressure to rush to completion the defenses
of Mobile, but his efforts were proving futile due to shortages of men and material
and Sheliha became increasingly frustrated by the lack of response to his pleas for
assistance, even to the point of requesting reassignment, which like many of his
other requests was denied. Then the unthinkable happened - the Federal fleet of
seventeen ships under Admiral Farragut ran past Fort Morgan on August 5th 1864
with the loss of only a single ship and took control of Mobile Bay. Even though it
was General Maury who had ordered Sheliha to leave part of the ship channel
open for blockade runners, it was Sheliha who took most of the criticism for the
failure of his underwater torpedoes to stop Farragut's fleet. Because of the
tremendous pressure on Sheliha, General Maury was concerned about his state of
mind and received approval to have the Departmental Chief Engineer, Samuel H.
Lockett, temporarily assigned to command the engineering efforts at Mobile, even
though Lockett first had to be promoted to Colonel so that he would outrank
Sheliha. Lockett's engineering reputation had been established in-part at
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Vicksburg where he had designed the Confederate defensive fortifications that
were used to successfully repel two determined attacks of Union forces under
General U. S. Grant. By the last week of August 1864 Lockett had taken command
of Mobile's defenses and reported in a letter to his wife that Sheliha had taken
"quite ill" and was not expected to return to work any time soon. Undoubtedly the
months of arduous and stressful labor exacerbated by snowballing frustrations had
taken their toll on his health. Sheliha, amazingly, recuperated quickly and was
back to work by mid-September, as indicated by his name re-appearing on official
correspondence by that date.

38

Labor Shortages
The most pervasive, by far, of all the shortages experienced by the
engineers at Mobile was the shortage of labor. The construction of fortifications
was extremely labor intensive. The excavation and piling of thousands and
thousands of cubic yards of earth and the cutting of hundreds of acres of timber
was accomplished using nothing but picks, shovels, axes and hard labor. Although
the shortage of unskilled labor was the biggest problem, there were shortages of
skilled labor also. The manufacture and assembly of ordnance fuses, underwater
torpedoes, sub-terra shells, as well as artillery platforms, mechanisms and
embrasure screens required a substantial work force of skilled and semi-skilled
labor.
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By the fall of 1864, engineering work on Mobile's defenses had been
organized into five divisions responsible for overseeing; 1) city entrenchments, 2)
water batteries and obstructions protecting the bay approaches to the city, 3)
water batteries, obstructions and eastern shore fortifications protecting the river
approaches to Mobile, 4) placement of torpedoes in water approaches, and 5)
Mechanics and Workshops. Of course it was the last division of mechanics and
workshops that employed most of the skilled laborers, but the other divisions also
required skilled labor to some extent. For example, the vast quantity of underwater
torpedoes to be placed in the waterways required that this operation be conducted
around the clock without stop. The laying of torpedoes at night necessitated the
use of a calcium light (later called a "limelight") that produced a white, extremely
bright beam of light capable of illuminating a one and one-half mile long expanse
of water. A rod of calcium oxide formed the filament of the light, which was made
to incandesce by heating it to high temperature using a hydrogen-oxygen fueled
torch. Because of the inherent dangers of using pressurized containers of
hydrogen and oxygen gases, operation of the calcium light as well as the handling
of the explosive torpedoes were necessarily supervised by trained and skilled
technicians.
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As early as April 1864, Sheliha complained to the Engineer Bureau that he
was experiencing a critical shortage of skilled mechanics and technicians because
the conscription agents of the Bureau of Conscription were forcing them into the
Confederate Army at an alarming rate. Initially the Engineer Bureau responded
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with a typical bureaucratic runaround suggesting that the most effective way to
deal with this problem was for Sheliha to gain "the assistance and cooperation of
his commanding general," but eventually the Bureau realized the problem was
affecting engineering operations everywhere and they solicited the Secretary of
War's assistance in instructing the Bureau of Conscription to refrain from
conscripting individuals that the Engineer Bureau considered indispensable.
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Although the skilled mechanics and technicians were essential to the
engineering effort at Mobile, hired or impressed slaves performed most of the
actual work of construction, which was enormous in its magnitude. At one point In
September 1864 after the Union fleet was in Mobile Bay, Colonel Lockett reported
that 4,500 laborers were then employed in the construction of Mobile's defenses.
Even this level of the work force was considered minimally adequate, but it was
not sustained for more than a month or two because of the 60-day limit on
impressed labor that required return of slaves to their owners after the time limit
had expired. By November Sheliha was reporting unsatisfactory progress due to
shortage of hands. In March of 1865 when the Confederates knew that a Union
attack was imminent, they worked frantically to complete the work on the
defenses, but Lockett reported that his black labor force had dwindled to 1,000
workers of which less than half were hired or impressed slaves, the majority being
captured prisoners from the U.S. Colored Troops.

41

Hiring agents for the engineers continually attempted to hire slaves on
longer-term contracts, but the terms allowed by regulation were insufficient to
40
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induce planters to hire out laborers in significant quantities. Consequently, most
military commanders in the South were forced to resort to impressments of slaves
in order procure labor. This system had proven largely ineffective and was
extremely unpopular with slave owners due to the low rates of compensation, the
disruption it caused to their planting and harvesting operations, the lack of care
provided to their slaves in some cases, and the tendency of military commanders
to violate the 60-day limit on impressments.
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In Mobile, Sheliha’s predecessor, Brigadier General Danville Leadbetter,
had operated under a system of impressment that relied heavily upon the
cooperation of the Alabama governor. Military officers in Mobile would present
requisitions for labor to the governor who, in turn, would order the impressment of
the needed slaves, which impressments had to be in compliance with the
impressment laws of the state. Throughout the South, gubernatorial cooperation in
this type of system steadily declined due mainly to its unpopularity and the
consequent negative impact on the re-election of the participating state
executives. The system proved incapable of supplying Leadbetter's need for labor.
For example, in March 1863 he requested 5,000 workers and less than half that
many were provided. By May Leadbetter's work force had declined to only 750
laborers, and in June he had to suspend construction at Fort Gaines due to lack of
workers even though he had tried to hire workers for two dollars per day plus
subsistence, terms considerably better than the standard twenty dollars per month
impressment compensation. In July 1863 Governor Shorter of Alabama lost his bid
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for re-election with his opponents reminding the electorate that Shorter had been
responsible for impressing between eight and ten thousand of their slaves earlier
in the year.
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In addition to his responsibility for the procurement of the labor that he
needed, Chief Engineer Leadbetter also strove to provide the food, clothing,
shelter and medical care needed by his work force. To maintain their health he
ordered that each worker receive one and one-half food rations daily, which was
fifty percent more than given to Confederate soldiers. He even issued daily
tobacco rations at one point, but discontinued the practice when planters objected
to his deducting the cost of the tobacco from their payments. He allowed sick
workers to be excused from work only after examination by a physician or medical
officer. He struggled to provide adequate clothing for the workers, requesting a
detail of soldiers to manufacture shoes for them on one occasion. He rented
warehouses and converted them to living quarters, but was only marginally
successful at maintaining sanitary conditions when they became overcrowded. He
was able to avoid serious outbreaks of bacterial disease, however, by acting
quickly to treat waste with large quantities of lime and by opening new
warehouses. Still, he was not able to avoid an outbreak of smallpox in the black
quarters early in October 1863. Leadbetter immediately ordered the vaccination of
the entire labor force and was in the process of establishing quarantine quarters
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when he was transferred to a new assignment, leaving his successor to deal with
the crisis.

44

Leadbetter's replacement as Chief Engineer at Mobile, Lt. Col. Viktor Von
Sheliha, worked diligently to improve the defenses of Mobile, but his efforts
suffered from chronic labor shortages also. When the commander of the
Confederate Engineer Bureau, Major General Jeremy Gilmer, inspected Mobile’s
defenses in February and March of 1864, he recommended improvements which
would require a labor force of 6,000 to implement according to Sheliha's estimates.
But Sheliha raised a mere 1,414 hands during the month of March forcing him to
send hiring agents into Mississippi and Louisiana, but with little success.
Beginning in late March 1863, Confederate military commanders had been
authorized by law to impress slave labor using military authority only and requiring
no involvement of the state governors. Sheliha, however, continued to hound
Governor Watts of Alabama well into August 1864 to provide more laborers to
Mobile. Finally Governor Watts complained to General Maury at Mobile stating,
the State of Alabama declined to make impressments after Congress gave the
Confederate authorities the right to make them…Yet your chief engineer in Mobile does not
seem to understand the relation to which the State of Alabama stands to the Confederate
authorities; he seems to think that the Governor of Alabama is only a high sheriff to
execute the laws of Congress…But as the Confederate authorities have made the orders
for impressments, I do not think it right to mix the State authority with the Confederate…[it]
would produce inextricable confusion. 45

The Inspector General who inspected Mobile's military operations in April
1864 had high praise for the engineering work that Sheliha had accomplished, but
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he deplored the shortage of labor that was delaying the completion of the work,
stating, "The impressed labor is being hourly returned to the planters, and no
sufficient means has yet been provided to supply it." As a partial solution, General
Maury had organized a white labor force composed of soldiers sentenced to hard
labor by court martial, but this small force could supply only a fraction of the
needed labor. When Sheliha's hiring agents were unable to hire the needed labor,
Sheliha petitioned the Secretary of War for approval to offer increased contract
terms, however, this request was denied with the oft-repeated advice that
"recourse should be made to impressments." General Maury may have been
somewhat reluctant to impose large-scale impressments on the local population
due to the fact that he also depended on the local population to provide recruits for
his thin infantry regiments and he did not want to risk creating animosity among
potential recruits.

46

The military situation in Mobile changed drastically in early August 1864,
when the Federal fleet entered Mobile Bay. The design and construction of
Mobiles defenses had been focused on withstanding direct attack on the city by
army forces with secondary considerations given to defending against naval
attack. Now attention had to be focused on the immediate naval attack as well as
a possible supporting land attack from the direction of Pensacola. This last
possibility dictated the need for construction of eastern shore fortifications at
Spanish Fort and at the town site of Blakely to protect Confederate shore batteries
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on the Apalachee River that prevented enemy ship access to Mobile through the
eastern rivers. The urgent requirement for a large increase in workers needed at
Spanish Fort and at Blakely forced General Maury to exercise his powers of
impressment, and his efforts were largely successful, being aided by the fact that
the crop harvest was over, or soon to be over, and planters were more willing to
hire out their slaves. The result was a total engineering labor force increase to
4500 hands by September 3rd, as described previously. Just three weeks prior to
this date, Sheliha had reported that construction was delayed by "an entirely
inadequate working force."

47

The Mobile labor force received an unexpected boost in late September
when Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest took almost nine hundred prisoners
belonging to regiments of the U. S. Colored Troops, and these troops were put to
work on the Mobile defenses. The policy of the Confederate government with
regard to captured U.S. Colored Troops was to return those who were former
slaves to their owners, but to leave the fate of captured free Blacks to the
discretion of the commanding officer. However, in October of 1864 the
Confederate Government finally agreed to accord prisoner of war status to
captured free blacks, making it illegal to use them as slave labor. It is unknown as
to what proportion the captured soldiers at Mobile were former slaves or free
blacks, but regardless of their status, it appears that General Maury violated stated
Confederate policy since he neither returned them to their owners, nor gave them
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prisoner of war rights. This conclusion results from documented reports that more
than 800 of these captured soldiers were still in the Mobile labor force in January
and March of 1865. Perhaps Maury felt justified in his actions because the
prisoners had been taken prior to the October agreement, and possibly did not fall
under its terms. In his post-war writings, General Richard Taylor claimed that all
these laborers were ex-slaves whose owners “could not be reached.” Taylor
further explained that the primary reason for using these captured U. S. Colored
troops as forced laborers was the concern that they have “healthy employment”
rather than for the “value of their work.” Even though President Abraham Lincoln
had issued a General Order in July of 1863 that included provisions for putting
Confederate prisoners to hard labor, in reprisal for enslavement of black Union
prisoners by the Confederates, these provisions were never enforced and
Confederates continued to use captured black soldiers for forced labor throughout
the war.

48

During the months of September and October 1864, Sheliha and Lockett
reported outstanding progress of the work on city defenses and at Spanish Fort
and at Blakely in their weekly and monthly status reports. This progress was a
direct result of the increased labor force made available by General Maury's all-out
effort to impress as many workers as possible. On September 4th, Lockett
reported that three redoubts at Spanish Fort were in various stages of completion

48

OR, ser. II, vol. 8, pt. 1, 803-4; Brainerd Dyer, “The Treatment of Colored Union Troops by the
Confederates, 1861-1865,” The Journal of Negro History 20, no. 3 (1935): 280-281; OR, ser. I, vol.
49, pt. 1, 1055-6; Richard Taylor, 210; John David Smith, “Let Us All Be Grateful That We Have
Colored Troops That Will Fight,” in Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the Civil War
Era, ed. John David Smith (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 47.

72

and that the wharf at Blakely had been repaired, which was an indication that the
work there was increasing. Lockett also mentions that work was being continued
on a bridge and military road between Spanish Fort and Blakely. Two weeks later
Colonel John H. Gindrat, who had been placed in charge of all engineering
operation on the Eastern shore, reported that the bridge portion of this road across
Bay Minette was almost ready for crossing.
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It seems improbable that the engineers were actually bridging Bay Minette a water expanse of more than a mile. What seems more likely is that they bridged
the Bay Minette swamp that lay west of Bay Minette proper, since this route for a
road would connect Spanish Fort with Blakely, whereas a bridge across Bay
Minette itself would connect areas outside the Spanish Fort defenses with the
areas laying east of Blakely and outside its defensive fortifications. Brigadier
General St. John R. Liddell, Confederate commander of troops on the Eastern
Shore, took credit for ordering the construction of this five-mile long causeway and
road, by which a thousand troops escaped to Fort Blakely after evacuating
Spanish Fort on the night of 8 April 1865. Liddell's claim is supported by the fact
that he had arrived in Mobile two to three weeks previous (on August 17) to the
first mention of the bridge in the status report of September 4.
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In Lt. Col. Sheliha's progress report for the month of September 1864, he
reports that a six-gun battery "with front and rear parapets" at Blakely had been
completed to the point that it was ready for installation of its guns. At today's
Blakeley Historic Park there is no battery meeting this description. It is possible
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that it could be the battery that Sheliha later refers to as the "water battery." The
1865 map of the Blakely fortifications show an enclosed (with front and rear
parapets) battery located very near the river bank some distance north of the
Blakely town site. If this battery still exists, it is outside of Blakeley Park property
on a privately owned fifty-acre tract, which fronts the Tensaw River.
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As part of his progress report, Sheliha also included a lengthy paragraph
justifying the need for fortifications at Spanish Fort and at Blakely. Apparently, the
wisdom of expending precious and dwindling resources to construct these
fortifications had been called into question. With respect to the Blakely
fortifications, Sheliha argued that,
The importance of a strong foothold at Blakely consists less in establishing a second line of
defenses of the water approaches to Mobile than in preventing the enemy from
establishing a battery at a point from which he could easily interrupt our communication by
Spanish, Raft and Tensas River with Batteries Huger and Tracy.

Sheliha further stated his intentions to construct a fortified line of five redoubts at
Blakely with each end anchored on the river. The design of a five-redoubt line was
later expanded to consist of nine redoubts, or else the "five" in the text was a
transcription error that should have been "nine". In either case, this description by
Sheliha of the Blakely fortification design is the first recorded and provides some
evidence that Sheliha was most probably the designer of these fortifications.

52

For the month of October Sheliha and Lockett reported that the Blakely
work force was employed in the clearing of timber in front of and behind the
planned line of redoubts, and also in the loading of barges with earth and sod for
use at batteries Tracy and Huger. Also reported was that work on the water battery
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had been suspended by order of General Maury and that the lumber and gun
platforms contained therein were sent to Spanish Fort. Apparently General Maury
saw as superfluous the placement of a water battery in a fortification designed to
oppose an attack by land.
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Sheliha reported little progress at Blakely during November and by midNovember he reported unsatisfactory progress on city entrenchments due to
scarcity of workers. The scarcity of workers was probably due to the expiration of
60-day impressments that had commenced in late August and early September.
Late November also brought hard rain and freezing weather, which further slowed
the work. The inclement weather reported by Sheliha may have been extremely
hard on the labor force, especially at remote locations such as Spanish Fort and
Blakely where living quarters were probably tents or impromptu shelters at best,
and there are indications that tents were in short supply. In January 1863, an
engineer officer at Fort Gaines telegraphed a request to General Leadbetter, then
Chief Engineer at Mobile, "Send me twenty tents for Negroes by first boat."
Leadbetter's terse reply was, "No tents to be had." Such rugged living conditions
could explain why at least two slave owners filed claims with the engineer office for
the value of slaves who had died while employed on Mobile's defenses. One
owner stated in his claim that two of his women slaves had died of "neglect and
exposure" while thus employed.
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The month of December brought an improvement in the progress reported
for construction at Blakely. By mid December Sheliha reported that one redoubt at
Blakely had been completed and a second redoubt was near completion. In
addition, the clearing of timber behind the line of redoubts had been extended on
the southern end of the line all the way to the road that was under construction
between Blakely and Spanish Fort. On the 25th of December, Sheliha reported
completion of three redoubts with a fourth to be completed soon. Fifty yards of rifle
pits had been dug and the clearing of land continued. December also brought an
increase in the urgency for the completion of Mobile's defenses. Departmental
headquarters alerted General Maury that the Federals were planning a movement
against Mobile with a force of at least 20,000 men. Headquarters urged Maury to
hasten the completion of his defensive works "with all possible vigor." As an
indication of the urgency felt by the Confederate command, General Maury was
instructed, for the very first time, to employ his soldiers in the completion of the
works if necessary. As a matter of policy the Confederate Army did not use
soldiers to construct earthworks when avoidable, believing it be destructive to
morale, however, the seriousness of the situation dictated extraordinary measures
be taken.
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There is no evidence, however, that General Maury resorted to the use of
his soldiers to complete Mobile's fortifications. The workforce seemed to have
stabilized somewhat and the engineering reports for January, February and March
of 1865 no longer made mention of lack of progress due to labor shortages. There
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are two factors that most likely account for this development. The first being that
slave labor during the winter months, between the fall harvest and the spring
planting season, was much easier to hire than at other times of the year, and the
second factor being the presence of the 800 plus black Union prisoners who were
being used as slave labor. Mobile's engineering labor force in March 1865
numbered about 1,000 hands with an additional 400 black laborers employed by
other departments. Based on the outstanding construction progress reported by
Sheliha and Lockett during the first three months of 1865, it can be concluded with
reasonable certainty that the size of the workforce was fairly stable during this time
period and that it was considered adequate by the commanding engineers.

56

With regard to the captured U. S. Colored Troops, one might think that they
would be extremely reluctant laborers, but Colonel Lockett's report for March 1865
contained some interesting data. He reported that out of 889 privately owned
slaves in the workforce, 263 of them were absent without leave which represented
a 30 percent desertion rate. For the publicly owned slaves (captured prisoners) he
reported only 29 out of 825 were absent, representing a much lower 4 percent
absentee rate. The large difference between the two groups was possibly due to
the presence of armed guards for the prisoners and not for the slaves, or it could
have to do with the proximity of the homes of the slaves compared to the more
distant ones of the prisoners, or it might be explained by the eagerness of the
planters to have their slaves present for the spring plowing and planting. General
Richard Taylor related a conversation that he had with one of these captured black
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soldiers who was working on Mobile’s defenses. The laborer stated that the
workers were given plenty of good food and furthermore, that, if given guns, they
would help defend the earthworks they had built stating, “We would rather fight for
our own white folks than for strangers.”

57

Shortage of Soldiers
Although the Confederates at Mobile were able to solve their labor shortage
problems just in the nick of time, they were not quite as successful at providing a
minimally adequate infantry force. The decision to defend Mobile with a garrison of
only 4500 infantry soldiers was made at the highest levels of the Confederate
command structure and resulted in a predictable outcome. During the time that
Major General Dabney Maury was commander at Mobile, beginning in May 1863,
the size of his garrison had varied considerably because he was often called upon
to provide regiments and brigades to commanders with more pressing needs.
During times when Mobile was not being seriously threatened, Maury dutifully
complied with these requests because he understood the importance of mutual
support between the various Confederate commands. When Mobile was
threatened by an obvious massing of Union troops in late 1864 and early 1865,
Maury's pleas for more troops fell on mostly deaf ears. He was at last provided
with the remnants of Major General Samuel French's Division, commanded by
Brigadier General Francis Cockrell and consisting of three brigades whose ranks
had been decimated by their participation in General John B. Hood’s disastrous
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Tennessee campaign in the fall of 1864. This help was welcomed as it provided an
additional 3,000 troops, but the increase proved woefully inadequate.

58

The pitiful state of General Maury's garrison at Mobile was evident in his
request for more troops dated November 10, 1864 in which he states that two
months of sickness in the ranks had left him with only 700 effective Army troops
with which to defend Mobile against land attack. He requested the War
Department furnish him with 4,000 to 5,000 veteran troops from states other than
Alabama. Such preference was probably based on his experience that the
Alabama troops were prone to make frequent and unapproved visits home with
many never returning. Another month would pass before Union plans to launch an
attack against Mobile became apparent, but Maury's request nevertheless
received endorsement from Department Commander Lieutenant General Richard
Taylor. The Secretary of War would not be swayed, however, replying to Maury
"Reinforcements cannot…be spared for the doubtful contingency of an unreported
attack." This rebuff prompted Maury to issue an urgent plea to the governor of
Alabama for state troops to be sent to Mobile as soon as possible. Not to leave
any stone unturned, Maury also wrote to the governor of Mississippi asking if he
might be able to send Mississippi troops to Mobile.
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In December, Department Commander Richard Taylor put the weight of his
authority behind General Maury, sending his own urgent plea to the Governor of
Alabama, begging him for troops. Taylor stated that the current forces under his
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Departmental command were inadequate for the successful defense of Mobile
explaining that the only possible source of additional troops was the Alabama
State Militia. In January 1865, General P. G. T. Beauregard, writing from Mobile,
warned Confederate President Jefferson Davis that General Taylor's Department
could not possibly defend successfully the states of Mississippi and Alabama with
his current forces and recommended that General Kirby Smith be compelled to reenforce Taylor or, alternately, be ordered to attack Saint Louis or New Orleans to
divert Union forces away from Mobile. Davis tried on several occasions to
persuade Smith to bring all or part of his army east of the Mississippi, but Smith
was unwilling to risk capture of his troops by attempting to ferry them across the
Union controlled Mississippi River. Davis's inability to reinforce the Mobile garrison
left the city at the mercy of the advancing Federals.
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By March 1865 Maury had been reinforced with French's Division and he
reported 9,029 effective troops in Mobile consisting of approximately 4,000
infantry, 3,000 artillerymen and 2,000 cavalry. This is the force that he had
available to defend against the Union attack of April 1865. When it became
apparent that the Union attack was focused on the Eastern shore fortifications at
Spanish Fort and at Blakely, Maury sent his entire infantry force across the bay to
defend these forts, leaving the city defenses manned by 3,000 artillerymen and
dismounted cavalry. The eastern shore fortifications were under the command of
Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell who remained at Fort Blakely with 2,700
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troops, and he assigned command of Spanish Fort to Brigadier General Randall L.
Gibson who commanded 1,800 troops at that location.

61

Maury's report of March 10, 1865 contained a detailed accounting of all
troops assigned to his command, and this accounting contained some revealing
information. As mentioned previously, Maury reported over 9,000 effective troops,
but he also reported over 12,000 troops present - meaning that he had 3,000
troops considered incapable of performing their duties for various reasons. The
most alarming figures that Maury provided, however, reveal the extent of
absenteeism (or desertion) within the Confederate ranks. While he reported over
12,000 troops present, he reports his total aggregate of assigned troops, present
and absent, to be well over 28,000 meaning that he had over 16,000 troops absent
and unaccounted for. These figures indicated an overall absentee percentage of
over fifty seven percent of assigned troops. Maury's figures for Randall Gibson's
brigade of Louisianans indicated an absentee percentage of seventy-five percent
and that of several other infantry brigades exceeded seventy percent. Many of
these absentees were assuredly deserters, but at least some of them could have
been unconfirmed casualties or men taken prisoner who were missing and were
still being carried on the rolls, but even so, the absentee figures were extremely
high and foretold the approaching end for the struggling Confederacy.
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Some who have studied Confederate desertions have placed the average
desertion rate at about 13 percent over the course of the war with a surge of
desertions occurring during the winter of 1864-65. Confederate desertions are
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hard to quantify because many soldiers would desert when their units passed
close to home only to rejoin their regiments at a later date. Others deserted their
units far-away from home and re-enlisted in units closer to their families. Some
believed that a primary cause of desertions was women who wrote their husbands
letters pleading for their return to their families. Especially vulnerable to the
desertion impulse were those Confederate soldiers whose home and families were
threatened by invading Union armies and also those soldiers whose loved ones
were living in destitute circumstances. All of these factors most likely played a part
in the high absentee rates reported by General Maury in the spring of 1865.
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The thin ranks of the troops assigned to General Liddell on the eastern
shore also foretold the Union victories at Spanish Fort and at Blakely. It was fairly
astonishing that these garrisons held out as long as they did being so decidedly
outmanned and outgunned. The Spanish Fort garrison held their ground for two
weeks before evacuating the fort under cover of darkness on the 8th of April.
Blakely, however, was not so fortunate, holding out for nine days before a
determined Union attack overran the fortifications on April 9th with most of the
Confederate defenders being taken prisoner. Liddell wrote after the war that his
garrison at Blakely was about 2,500 soldiers, which was adequate to man only
one-half of the defensive line. He was forced to space the soldiers to cover the
entire 3,500 yard length of the fortifications leaving a line that "was nothing more
than a good skirmish line, whose fire was entirely too weak." When the majority of
the Spanish Fort garrison was evacuated to Blakely during the night of April 8,
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Liddell was upset that General Maury did not let them remain at Blakely, but
instead ordered them to be taken to Mobile by steamer. Liddell later wrote that had
he been allowed to keep the Spanish Fort garrison which probably numbered in
the range from 1,200 to 1,500 men, he could have repelled the Union assault of
April 9. Although Liddell was generally quick to point out the faults and failures of
others and was overly candid when speaking his mind, he did not criticize General
Maury or the decisions that he made, writing after the war, "I know that General
Maury did all in his power, but it was impossible to hold the defenses with such
inadequate forces."
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Discussion and Conclusions
Although Mobile's engineers eventually found the labor necessary for
construction of the fortifications at Spanish Fort and at Blakely, Generals Liddell
and Gibson both complained that the fortifications were not complete at the time
they were occupied by their troops. Surprisingly, part of this incompleteness was
intentional. In October 1864 Colonel Lockett had instructed Sheliha to make no
provisions for underground bunkers, or "bombproofs" as they were called, either at
Spanish Fort or at Blakely. The purpose of the bombproofs was to protect the
garrison during heavy artillery bombardments, which usually preceded an infantry
attack. The reason for Lockett's order is unclear because he presented different
reasons for his decision on different occasions. When he gave the order to Sheliha
in October, Lockett stated that he did not believe that the heavy expenditure of
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labor and resources required for their construction was warranted under the
circumstances. He believed the Confederate garrison would be attacked by
infantry and field (light) artillery for which conventional earthworks would provide
sufficient protection. As it turned out Lockett was completely wrong in this belief,
because the Union Forces that were soon to move against Mobile's eastern shore
defenses included large siege trains containing heavy artillery that was used with
devastating effect especially at Spanish Fort.
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In Lockett's defense, it must be remembered that he had a tremendous
amount of work to complete, but time was running out and some compromises had
to be made. His frustrations with the situation were apparent in his response to a
suggestion from the Engineer Bureau that batteries Tracy and Huger should be
relocated to improve their effectiveness.
there has been too much labor expended on the works as they now stand to admit to any
change. I have scrupulously avoided making any material alterations in the works at this
point, as this policy has already been pursued almost to a ruinous extent, resulting in great
increase of expense and retardation of operations that long since should have been
completed. 66

In January 1865 Lockett reported status of the eastern shore defenses to
the Engineer Bureau revealing the fact that he had constructed no bombproofs for
the garrisons. The reason he offered the Bureau was quite different from the
reason he gave Sheliha just three months previous. Lockett justified his actions to
the Bureau by saying, "I think past experience in this district indicates very plainly
that such temptations to the garrison to leave its post on the parapet are extremely
dangerous, or, at least, of doubtful propriety." Lockett did not elaborate on the
65
66

OR, ser. I, vol. 39, pt. 3, 792.
OR, ser. I, vol. 45, pt. 2, 780.

84

"past experience" to which he referred, but his meaning is clear - that the soldiers
could not be trusted to man the lines as long as bombproofs were available for
their occupation. Although Lockett's assessment might have been accurate, it still
makes one wonder why he gave different justifications on these two different
occasions. A possible explanation might be that Lockett's reasoning in October
1864, that bombproofs would not be needed for protection against field artillery,
had some credibility at the time, but by January the Confederates knew that the
Union forces on the move toward Mobile included siege trains with heavy artillery,
thus forcing Lockett to formulate a different justification.
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The fortifications at Spanish Fort and at Blakely were constructed using
slave labor and that of captured black prisoners, but Confederate soldiers did not
completely escape the pick and shovel. The incomplete state of the works when
the Confederate soldiers occupied them dictated their completion by the troops,
since all but a few of the slaves had been evacuated to points north of Mobile by
that time. The extent of this labor at Blakely is unknown since no detailed report of
the siege and battle was issued, however, the report by General Gibson at
Spanish Fort indicated that his soldiers worked night and day to the point of
exhaustion to complete the works, to extend the lines and to construct the
bombproofs that Lockett had not provided. This heroic two-week effort on the part
of Gibson's men, while commendable, only served to postpone the inevitable.
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From today's perspective it seems strange that the Confederate command
did not move to reinforce General Maury in Mobile given their unanimous
agreement that the defense of Mobile was an important objective and given the
great disparity in the size of the Union forces versus that of Maury's command.
The Confederate forces numbered 9,000 while the Federals under General Canby
totaled about 49,000. The conventional military wisdom of the time was that for a
commander to be successful in attacking a fortified position of the enemy, he must
have at least a three-to-one numerical advantage over the entrenched enemy.
Union commander Canby enjoyed an advantage of almost six-to-one over Maury's
forces. Justifying his decision not to reinforce Maury, President Davis wrote to
Robert E. Lee the very day that Union forces were preparing to invest Spanish
Fort,
I…have considered the garrison there sufficient for its defense against any attack from the
Gulf side, the peculiar character of the approaches requiring any force operating from that
base to move over a country offering many opportunities for defense, or to make so wide a
detour as to expose them to flank attacks, destruction of their trains, necessarily insufficient
for a long march, and therefore to probable defeat.

While accepted military doctrine said that defensive fortifications acted as a
multiplying factor of three-to-one, Davis' preposterous argument was that the
Confederates at Mobile did not even need that advantage, that they could defeat
an enemy force almost six times their number in open country due to "the peculiar
character of the approaches." Davis’s words to Lee are inexplicable. Perhaps
Davis was embarrassed or ashamed to admit to Lee that he had been unable to
coax Kirby Smith to cross the Mississippi and provide the needed reinforcement.
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Unwilling to make that admission, he simply fabricated a reason for not reinforcing
the Mobile garrison.
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In the end, the shortage of soldiers in General Maury's command was the
ultimate reason for their defeat at Spanish Fort and at Blakely. Shortages of
engineers and laborers at Mobile, while serious, were problems that were
addressed by commanding officers and that were solved to a degree that was
perhaps less than desirable but that, nevertheless, was adequate to achieve their
minimal objectives. The shortage of soldiers, however, was a nut too hard to crack
given the dwindling resources of the South and the fading resolve of the southern
people to continue the war. General Maury's shortage of soldiers at Spanish Fort
and at Fort Blakely was arguably a blessing in disguise for the South. Had Maury
somehow been given a garrison of soldiers approaching in size that of the Union
Forces under General Canby, the fighting at Spanish Fort and at Blakely could
have continued for days longer than it did, possibly producing a Confederate
victory or at least a standoff. Casualties possibly would have soared, increasing
each day until the news of Robert E. Lee's surrender reached the battlefield. All
the added carnage would have been for naught since the reality of the South's
defeat and the futility of continuing hostilities would have been evident to all. The
war was over, General Lee had surrendered, and nothing could save the
Confederacy at this point. As it was, soldiers lost their lives, but casualties were
held to a minimum by the escape of the Spanish Fort garrison and by the quick
victory of the Federals at Blakely. Ultimately, Maury's shortage of soldiers may
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have been responsible for sparing the lives of hundreds, perhaps thousands of
men, who would be so direly needed in the months and years to come as the
country and particularly the South struggled to rebuild and to recover from the
devastation that four years of cruel war had wrought.
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APPENDIX A: FORT BLAKELY HISTORICAL TIMELINE

89

8 February 1862
Report from Major General Braxton Bragg commanding the Department of
Alabama and West Florida to the Adjutant-General of the Confederate States
Army stating the need for fortifications at Blakely, "A battery is necessary, too at
the town of Blakely to prevent a passage around in that direction, by which our
communication might be intercepted with Pensacola and Montgomery." No one
else apparently saw the need for fortifications at Blakely until Mobile was seriously
threatened by presence of the Federal fleet off the entrance into Mobile Bay in July
1864.
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2 March 1864
Correspondence from A.L. Rives to Gen J.F. Gilmer then at Mobile, stating that he
was endeavoring to procure additional engineer officers immediately for duty at
Mobile. He added, "The increase of the Corps to meet the requirements of the
service is becoming a matter of urgency.
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13 April 1864
Report of the Inspector General, having inspected the District of Mobile
commanded by Major General Dabney Maury, praising the work of the Chief
Engineer at Mobile, Lt. Col. Viktor Von Sheliha, and deploring the shortage of
labor that was delaying the completion of the defenses of Mobile, "The impressed
labor is being hourly returned to the planters, and no sufficient means has yet
been provided to supply it." As a stop-gap measure, General Maury had organized
70
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a white labor force composed of soldiers sentenced to hard-labor by court martial,
but this force could only supply a fraction of the needed labor. This was to be a
common and oft-repeated complaint of the engineering officers in charge of
constructing the defenses of Mobile including those at Spanish Fort and at Blakely
on the eastern shore of Mobile Bay.
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The Inspector General had soaring praise for the Chief Engineer at Mobile
and the fortifications he had designed, and Sheliha was indeed a rising star in the
Confederate Engineer Bureau, and he achieved international notoriety after the
war when he published a treatise on the design and construction of coastal
defenses. The brightness of his star was somewhat diminished, however, when
the federal fleet brushed aside his defenses with the loss of only a single ship and
took control of Mobile Bay in August of 1864.
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9 Jul 1864
Sheliha reports to Col. A.L. Rives that Union Army is organizing a force of 20,000
men at New Orleans to send to operate against Mobile. Eighteen Union war
vessels now off the bar at Mobile with fifteen more expected. Maury has called for
5000 negroes.
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11 Jul 1864
Sheliha reports to Rives the current state of Mobil's defenses given that a Union
attack is imminent. He remind Rives that the defenses are still less than optimum
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due to the fact that "My earnest appeals for laborers have met with no success
whatever; we have had at no time a working force here adequate to the
stupendous work to be done; but for the last three months especially work has
been dragging along pitifully slowly for want of hands." He also recognizes the
need for fortifications on the eastern shore stating, "Should the enemy approach
from Pensacola a work near Blakely for the protection of batteries Huger and
Tracy ought to be built at once."
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5 August 1864
General Maury, commanding the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East
Louisiana, reports that seventeen Union vessels, fourteen ships and three ironclads, successfully ran past Fort Morgan and entered Mobile Bay. Major General
Jeremy F. Gilmer, commanding the CSA Engineer Bureau, recommends to
General Maury that every effort be made to hold Forts Morgan, Gaines and
Powell. He directs that "A full supply of labor should be obtained at once by
impressment if necessary." He further advises, "It is hoped you can prevent a
lodgment on east of bay at Blakely and southward."
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6 August 1864
Gilmer follows up with more detailed recommendations, "a work of some strength
should be built at Blakely, and at points south of that if necessary, to prevent the
enemy from effecting a lodgment. Dog River, Blakely, and Apalachee Rivers
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should be supplied with torpedoes and other obstructions at the earliest moment
possible." Gilmer was familiar with the defenses of Mobile having inspected them
in February of 1864. He knew that the only passable water route to Mobile was via
the eastern rivers at the northeast corner of the bay and that water batteries Tracy
and Huger located on the western riverbanks protected this route. What concerned
him was control of the commanding heights on the eastern shore where an enemy
lodgment would place the water batteries at risk of direct artillery fire or
interference with their supply communication.
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8 August 1864
General Maury reports that Forts Powell and Gaines guarding entrances to Mobile
Bay have surrendered.
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10 August 1864
Correspondence from General Maury stating that he has ordered Brigadier
General St. John R. Liddell, an experienced infantry commander, to Mobile at
once. When Liddell arrives on the 17th, Maury places him in command of all
Confederate forces on the eastern shore of Mobile Bay.
Correspondence from chief engineer Lt. Col. Sheliha to MG Gilmer, Chief of
Engineer Bureau, stating that he planned on constructing a heavy, self-supporting
work on the heights that commanded batteries Tracy and Huger, which would
command both water and land approaches. Sheliha includes this prophetic
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warning, "This work would have to be held at every hazard, else our own guns
would be turned against the batteries below."
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11 August 1864
Correspondence from Lt. Col. Sheliha to Col. John H. Gindrat instructing him to
proceed with plans to construct a major work commanding the Blakely River to be
located at the site of an old Spanish Fort, which site had been recommended by
Col. Gindrat himself. This site was chosen, I believe, because the heights at
Blakely town site were too far north to provide effective artillery protection for
batteries Tracy and Huger.
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19 August 1864
Lt. Col. Sheliha sends twenty-two torpedoes from Mobile to be placed in the
Blakely River opposite battery Huger leaving a narrow channel to allow small boat
communication with the work force at Spanish Fort.
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23 August 1864
Brigadier General Richard L. Page, commanding Fort Morgan, reports his
surrender to Union land forces. All entry points into Mobile Bay and the Bay itself,
excepting the northernmost Bay areas, are now under control of the Union Navy. 82
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3 September 1864
Letter from Colonel Samuel H. Lockett, chief engineer of the Department of
Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana, to General Joel Riggs, Assistant
Adjutant-General for the State of Alabama, thanking him for making available the
services of the Governor's aide-de-camp, Colonel John H. Gindrat. Lockett would
soon place Gindrat in charge of all engineering operations on the Eastern Shore,
which included the fortifications at Spanish Fort and Blakely, and Lockett himself
had recently been assigned temporary command of the engineering operations at
Mobile when it became obvious that Lt. Col. Sheliha was becoming overwhelmed
with problems. Lockett's engineering reputation had been established in-part at
Vicksburg where he had designed the Confederate defensive fortifications that
were used to successfully repel two determined attacks of Union forces under
General U. S. Grant. He also stated in this letter that the total force then employed
in constructing Mobile's defenses was 4500.
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4 September 1864
Weekly report of engineering operations at Mobile submitted by Lockett included
status of work at Spanish Fort and at Blakely. Three redoubts at Spanish Fort
were in various stages of completion and the wharf at Blakely had been repaired an indication that the work there was just getting started. Lockett also mentions
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that work is being continued on a bridge and military road between Spanish Fort
and Blakely.
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6 September 1864
Correspondence from Lockett to Gindrat officially placing him in charge of
engineering operations on the Eastern Shore, and giving detailed instructions for
the placement of obstructions in the Blakely River.
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16 September 1864
Progress report from Gindrat to Sheliha on Eastern Shore engineering operations,
stating that at Blakely a new work had been started near Sibley's brick yard and
that the bridge across Bay Minette was nearly ready for crossing.
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20 September 1864
Lockett instructs Sheliha to strengthen the obstructions in the Blakely and
Apalachee Rivers as soon as possible, and to give more attention to the field
works at Blakely - paying a visit there at his earliest convenience.
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5 October 1864
Lockett instructs Sheliha to make no arrangements for construction of bombproofs (underground bunkers) at Spanish Fort or at Blakely.
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6 October 1864
Lt. Col. Sheliha reports that a six-gun battery with front and rear parapets at
Blakely has been completed to the point that it is ready for installation of its guns.
During my six weeks at Blakely, I found no battery meeting this description. I
believe it to be the battery that Sheliha later refers to as the "water battery." The
1865 map of the Blakely fortifications show an enclosed (with front and rear
parapets) battery to be located very near the river bank some distance north of the
Blakely town site. If this battery still exists it is outside of Blakeley Park property on
what is commonly referred to as the "Mayer fifty acres." Sheliha further states his
intentions to construct a fortified line of five redoubts at Blakely with each end
anchored on the river.
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5 October 1864
Lockett reports that the labor force at Blakely has been employed clearing trees
and loading barges and flats with sod to be used at Batteries Tracy and Huger.
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23 October 1864
Sheliha reports that the labor force at Blakely has been employed in clearing the
ground for a new line of redoubts and in loading barges with sod to be used at
Battery Huger.
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3 November 1864
Sheliha reports that work on the water battery has been suspended by order of
MG Maury, and that the Blakely labor force has been employed clearing land and
loading barges with sod.
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6 November 1864
Sheliha reports Blakely work force employed in loading earth and sod onto barges
and in cutting wood for fuel.
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10 November 1864
MG Maury requests the war department provide him 4,000 to 5,000 veteran
infantry because the garrison at Mobile has been greatly reduced by sickness for
the past two months leaving only 700 effective troops to man the Mobile land
defenses.
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12 November 1864
Sheliha reports no progress at Blakely, only that fifty impressed laborers had been
sent to repair damages on the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad.
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20 November 1864
Sheliha reports unsatisfactory progress on city entrenchments due to scarcity of
workers, lack of transportation and much rain, also reports nothing for Blakely.
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23 November 1864
MG Maury sent urgent plea to Governor of Alabama to send state troops to Mobile
as soon as possible. He also wrote to Governor of Mississippi asking if he might
be able to send Mississippi troops to Mobile.
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27 November 1864
Sheliha reported little progress on city entrenchments due to hard rains and
severe freezes, and reported nothing for Blakely.
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11 December 1864
Engineers report that workers at Blakely have been working on the redoubt in the
rear of the brickyard and also employed in transporting earth and sod to Batteries
Huger and Tracy.
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12 December 1864
Department Commander, LG Richard Taylor, sends urgent plea to the Governor of
Alabama begging for troops, and stating that the current forces in his Department
are inadequate for the successful defense of Mobile, explaining that the only
possible source of additional troops is the Alabama State Militia.
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18 December 1864
Sheliha reported the battery in the rear of the brickyard at Blakely was completed,
and that the battery near the sawmill was completed with the exception of cutting
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the embrasures and laying the gun platforms. He also reported that the clearing of
land was extended to the road leading to Blakely from Spanish Fort.
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25 December 1864
A letter from Department headquarters alerting MG Maury that the Federals were
planning a movement against Mobile with a force of at least 20,000 men. The
letter urges Maury to hasten the completion of his defensive works "with all
possible vigor." The headquarters letter instructed Maury to employ his soldiers to
complete the works if necessary. Sheliha reports completion of three batteries,
soon to be four, at Blakely with the exception of platforms and embrasures. Fifty
yards of rifle pits were dug and clearing of land continued.
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29 December 1864
Letter from MG M. L. Smith, chief engineer of the Military Division of the West, to
Col. Lockett, instructing him to complete specific tasks in the construction of the
works at Spanish Fort. He also provided detailed instructions for the design and
construction of a treadway or narrow footbridge from Spanish Fort across the
marsh to the river bank opposite Battery Huger, and ordered that work on this
project be started as soon as possible. Smith also instructs that work on the abatis
at Spanish Fort and at Blakely be continued "until it becomes impassable under
fire."
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12 January 1864
Lockett provides a detailed report on the status of the Spanish Fort defenses to
Colonel A.L. Rives, assistant chief engineer of the Engineer Bureau. In his report
he explains that he had decided that no bomb-proofs were to be constructed for
the Spanish Fort Garrison.
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24 January 1865
General G. T. Beauregard warns President Jefferson Davis that LG Richard
Taylor's forces are woefully inadequate to successfully defend the states of
Mississippi and Alabama from an impending Union invasion. He suggests that the
only hope is to order Kirby Smith to either reinforce Taylor or to attack St. Louis or
New Orleans.
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31 January 1865
Lockett reports much progress at Blakely during the month of January. The
parapets of all redoubts (Nos. one through nine) had been strengthened, the
interior slopes of redoubts 2 and 3 had been revetted (reinforced), flanks and
embrasures for all redoubts had been constructed, embrasures of redoubts 6
though 9 had been revetted with hurdle revetments, two gun positions in
embrasures had been constructed, had added two guns at the sunken battery,
added thirty paces of rifle pits at redoubt no. 1, prepared material for abatis around
the entire line, and had cleared trees in front and on flank of redoubt no. 1.
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5 February 1865
Lockett reports more progress at Blakely; strengthened parapets at redoubts 5
through 8, revetted embrasures of redoubts 2, 7, 8, and 9 with hurdle revetments,
added flanks, thirty paces of rifle pits and two guns to redoubt no. 1, cleared trees
in front of redoubts 1 through 3, cut roads for interior communications from redoubt
3 to redoubt 9, and constructed causeways where needed.
At this point in the Official Record the engineering status reports cease. Perhaps
the engineering activity became so frantic and hurried, due to intelligence reports
of large Union forces moving toward Mobile, that there simply was no time for
officers to prepare status reports.
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20 March 1865
Confederate Eastern Shore Commander, BG Liddell, reported to MG Maury's chief
of staff via dispatch by steamer (the telegraph between Blakely and Mobile was
down) that a large Union force is moving northward up the eastern shore toward
Spanish Fort and Blakely, and is presently at Magnolia (about 30 miles away). He
suggests that whatever troops MG Maury wants to send can be landed at Blakely
and marched to Spanish Fort by the Bay Minette road. Liddell adds that the
treadway would probably be finished by Wednesday.
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22 March 1865
President Jefferson Davis writes General Robert E. Lee that he concurs with
General Richard Taylor's views relative to the importance of holding Mobile, but
that he does not agree that Mobile needs to be reinforced.
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24 March 1865
A force under the command of Brigadier-General Randall L. Gibson is sent by BG
Liddell to intercept the advancing Union force and hold it under observation.
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25 March 1865
Union forces initiate a flanking movement to the north toward Blakely. MG Maury
takes the field with the remaining forces under his command to join BG Gibson,
but due to the continued flanking movement of the Union troops Generals Maury
and Liddell are forced to withdraw into the Blakely defenses. General Gibson is
ordered to withdraw into the defenses of Spanish Fort.
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27 March 1865
Gibson reports repeated attacks by Union skirmishers all along his line, but all
were repulsed. Gibson also requested more entrenching tools since his lines on
his left had not been completed. The enemy had established heavy artillery
batteries all along their line. Gibson reported that artillery fire from battery Huger
was helping but he did not understand why the gunboats had not opened up on
the Union right. By the end of the day he requested another brigade with tools to
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assist in the completion of entrenchments on his left since his troops had already
been "worn down".
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28 March 1865
BG Liddell reported his cavalry met that of Union forces moving south from Pollard
toward Blakely. Liddell also reported Gibson's strength at Span. Ft. to be 3400.
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29 March 1865
BG Liddell orders a scout be sent to Stockton to determine whether the enemy has
reached that point.
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30 March 1865
BG Gibson repeats his request for more entrenching tools.
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31 March 1865
BG Gibson reported his ammunition would not last the night. He wanted more
delivered by morning at the latest. also reported that the enemy was constructing a
heavy siege battery a half mile in rear of his right flank on Bay Minette. Union
forces reported north of Blakely about 15 miles distant.
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1 April 1865
BG Gibson requested reinforcements from MG Maury, stating that he had only
1,700 infantry to oppose the two Union Army Corps that were pressing, night and
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day, closer to his main line. In a flurry of messages sent on this date, Maury not
only refuses to reinforce Gibson at Spanish Fort, but instructs Liddell to remove
one of Gibson's brigades and send it to Blakely. MG Maury is probably peeved at
Gibson for sending requests outside of his chain of command and refuses to
communicate directly with Gibson, relaying all of his responses through BG Liddell
at Blakely. Gibson protested Maury's action arguing that Blakely already had more
troops than Spanish Fort, and that he could not possibly hold Spanish Fort with his
reduced force. The tone of his last message to MG Maury, sent just before
midnight, bordered on impertinence, "Please answer if you have received my last
three telegrams relative to this matter. Answer my dispatches."
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1 April 1865
Union forces approach Blakely, and BG Liddell informs Brigadier General Thomas
commanding the green Alabama recruits, "the force of the enemy now in our front
is composed principally of negroes, and will not spare any of our men should they
gain possession of our works…station your men in the rifle pits, and impress upon
their minds the importance of holding their position to the last, and with the
determination never to surrender."
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2 April 1865
Liddell at Blakely reported that Union skirmishers were engaging his left flank. He
requested that a gunboat be placed in the mouth of Raft River to protect his left
and also requested additional light artillery pieces to reinforce the left part of his
117
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line. Gibson at Spanish Fort reported that the enemy was using 8-inch and 10-inch
mortars vigorously but was doing little damage. He again expressed great concern
that the heavy battery being constructed on the enemy's far right would do him
great damage. He requested that an iron-clad come down and enfilade the Union
right flank. He reported that his losses were decreasing every day and that the
confidence of his men was increasing.
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3 April 1865
Gibson at Spanish Fort reported that he had been mortar shelled all night long. He
expressed amazement at the amount of digging being performed by the enemy,
"He is fast converting his advanced skirmish line into his main line." He asked for
picks, for 200 negroes with tools, a supply of wooden embrasures, iron screens
and the heavy gun he had previously requested. Later in the day he expressed
disappointment that the heavy gun had not come and reduced his request for
laborers to 100 negroes with 50 axes and 50 picks. By the end of the day Gibson
complains about the delay in receiving thing he has requested, namely the
wooden screens, the heavy gun, and the negroes. He further requested a supply
of hand-grenades and an 8 or 10 inch mortar as the enemy has provided him with
a great supply of shells.
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4 April 1865
Gibson at Spanish Fort reports he received the 20-lb. Parrot (gun), the negroes
and the mortars late at night on the 3rd. He has been forced to extend his left flank
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by adding breastworks out to the bay requiring a great expenditure of labor, and
states that he may be required to do the same thing on his right. His already thin
line is being made thinner by these extensions. He repeated a request for 100
axes.
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5 April 1865
Liddell at Blakely reports that there has been heavy skirmishing on his front and
that the enemy has erected a battery on his left and they are firing from it
occasionally. Reports from Gibson at Spanish Fort on this date reflected growing
frustration and indications of desperation. He complained that the 30-lb. Parrot had
not arrived, "Can't these delays be prevented by increasing transportation?" He
complained about the lack of naval support, "I have given up all hope of our naval
boats ever finding out where the enemy's right flank is and attacking it." He states
that he was once again forced to lengthen his lines even though his small force
had been under "unbroken strain for two weeks." In order to make a successful
defense, Gibson argued, "I must be supplied with more heavy guns, more mortars,
more axes, more negroes." I think Gibson suspected that all of his pleading was in
vain because, as he observed in closing that, "The present means of
transportation from Mobile are wholly inadequate."
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6 April 1865
BG Gibson at Spanish Fort reported that the enemy continued to press forward his
lines by the usual zig-zags, and repeats a previous request, "I must have the
company of sappers and miners, and 200 negroes."
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7 April 1865
BG Gibson's requests become more desperate in tone, "I must have the things I
have asked for within the last three days, else disaster may happen."
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8 April 1865
BG Liddell at Blakely reported that enemy lines in front of redoubts 5, 6 and 7
opened a brisk fire at 2:30 a.m. that lasted for one and one-half hours. He returned
fire beginning at 8 a.m. and had received brisk return fire. One enemy battery in
front of redoubt 7 had thrown shells into Blakely and into the brickyard landing. He
had not been successful in silencing this battery. BG Gibson reported that enemy's
artillery was much more powerful than his and that enemy's heavy batteries had
enfiladed his lines near Battery 4 and the enemy had approached to within 150
yards at that location. He reported that he ceased firing from Battery McDermott
because the concentrated fire from the enemy could not be endured, and that
Ector's brigade on the left had been broken. By 9 p.m. Gibson reported that he
was withdrawing the Spanish Fort garrison via the treadway. The treadway was a
narrow elevated boardwalk, about 1,200 yards long, that had been constructed
from the left flank over Bayou Minette and across the marsh to the river bank
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opposite Battery Huger. From the end of the treadway the troops were ferried
across the river to Battery Huger, and from there by steamboat to Blakely for a
brief rest and then to Mobile. When all of these troops could not be taken from
Battery Huger before sunrise, it became necessary for about one thousand of
them to walk across the swamp to Blakely on foot, else they would be subjected to
artillery fire from the Union batteries having line-of sight contact with Battery
Huger.
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9 April 1865
BG Liddell reported that Blakely had been under the constant fire of five batteries
dismounting two guns. Liddell also expressed concern that the garrison from
Spanish Fort had left a large track through the swamp that could be followed by
the enemy to a point behind their lines. The right of the Confederate line was on a
bluff overlooking a swamp, and there was about one-quarter mile of unoccupied
swamp between the end of the Confederate line and the river, and Liddell knew
they were at risk of being attacked by Union troops following the muddy tracks left
in the swamp the night before by the evacuating troops from Spanish Fort. He said
he would move his quarters to this location (redoubt no. 9) so he could better
direct efforts to seal up this unforeseen hole in their defensive line. This explains
why he was captured at the far extreme of his line when the final Union assault
broke through the Confederate lines.
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Blakeley Daily Journal
Thursday, 16 Oct 2008
Travel from St. Cloud, FL to Point Clear, AL
Friday, 17 Oct 2008
Met with park Director JoAnn Flirt at 10:00 am. We discussed my work schedule
and park operating hours. Ms Flirt showed me a vacant office and desk that I could
use during my stay.
Ms Flirt also questioned me regarding cost of Global Positioning System
equipment including receiver hardware, mapping software and desktop computers.
She said that my project would be the start of the park’s long range plan to use
Global Positioning System mapping of all the parks historical and natural
resources as a management tool. The mapping database would serve as a source
of printed maps for use by park visitors and also serve as a location database for ;
Civil War historic features, Blakeley township historic features, wildlife habitat,
endangered species, exotic plant species, pine forests, hardwood forests,
wetlands, erosion risk areas, controlled burn areas, roads, trails, power line access
cuts, fire lanes, etc.
Ranger Thomas Harms gave me a driving tour of the park boundaries and the
various locations of Confederate and Union earthworks. He also showed me the
location of the two Confederate redoubts that are located outside the park on
privately owned land.
Monday, 20 Oct 2008
Set up a workspace in the park office trailer. Was unsuccessful at making internet
connections with my laptop. Cell phone connections at park are very spotty and
unreliable.
Walked a portion of the Confederate breastworks (about a mile) and planned how I
would map them. The Confederate breastworks north of redoubt # 4 are in woods
with heavy undergrowth. May not have adequate accessibility needed for
mapping.
In the afternoon I walked the remaining portion (about a mile) of the accessible
Confederate earthworks and planned how I would map them. Some of the
traverses in redoubts 6 thru 9 are so covered in briars that I cannot get the walking
access needed for mapping.

111

Discussed with ranger Tim Gilchrist the best approach for trying to reach
Confederate redoubt # 3 on foot. The line of rifle pits that leads to the redoubt is
very overgrown and is interrupted by a pond, which is negotiated by crossing a
beaver dam to pick up the line of breastworks on the other side of the pond.
Tuesday, 21 Oct 3008
Attended park staff meeting where Ms. Flirt discussed day-to-day operation
issues. She also reviewed findings from a recent Alabama state audit of park
operations.
Completed Global Positioning System mapping of redoubt no. 4 and some of the
Confederate advanced rifle pits in front of redoubt 4. Global Positioning System
satellite acquisition was poor in the afternoon, especially in forest cover. I
attempted to map redoubt no. 5 and its connecting rifle pits, but abandoned the
attempt due to inability to lock-on to the minimum number of satellites. The
number of satellites in view seems much better in the morning and begins
degrading one or two hours after noon.
I was able to map some of the Confederate advanced rifle pits that were in an
open field in front of Redoubt no. 4. Without the forest cover the satellite reception
was adequate.
I was told about a disappointed camper who had to leave the park with his wife at
2:00 am in the morning because they were swarmed by mosquitoes and besieged
by paranormal activity. His wife had been bitten by mosquitoes so many times that
she had to have help walking to the car. The couple was camping in a primitive
shelter on the very edge of a swamp (that explains the mosquitoes), and the
shelter is located within 100 feet of Confederate redoubt no. 9, which may help
explain the paranormal activity.
Requested from Ms. Flirt her permission for me to use the park's AOL account to
log on to the internet (using my laptop) should I need to access the UCF library or
state archives to do research. Request was denied presumably because I am not
a park employee.
Wednesday, 22 Oct 2008
Mapped the Confederate Redoubts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 as well as the line of
connecting rifle pits. Some of the traverses in the forts were 20 to 30 feet long but
due to the undergrowth I was able to map only the first 3 to 5 feet of many of them.
In the afternoon, I returned to the open field in front of Redoubt 4 and found some
more Confederate advanced rifle pits to map. I also tried to penetrate the thick
undergrowth around the line of breastworks that connects Redoubt 4 with Redoubt
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3. Starting at the dirt road that runs beside Redoubt 4, the first hurdle was a huge
bush on the edge of the road at the start of the breastworks. While trying to
trample down this bush, I noticed a coiled Eastern Diamondback about 18 inches
from my foot so I quickly retreated. The snake was a lot more calm than I was, he
never struck, rattled or even moved. So I walked back to the car, got my camera
and took his photograph. I thought about try to kill him but my only weapon was
my walking stick which was a dry, half rotten pine limb, so I knew that it would
break on the first blow and may not deliver a lethal strike.

Thursday, 23 Oct 2008
I stayed at the cottage this morning to see if I could get the DSL internet
connected. The real estate company that rented the cottage promised that it had
internet service but it still has not been activated. I was able to get a phone
company technician to come out and get it hooked up.
In the afternoon I tried to locate some of the Confederate batteries and rifle pits
that are shown on some of the old maps. I could not locate them today but one of
the rangers may be able to help me find them still. The satellite coverage was
again bad in forest cover so I would not have been able to map them had I found
them. It also started raining and I was forced to stop for the day. Ranger Tim
Gilchrist is the most knowledgeable on the earthworks since he has been at the
park for 17 years. He is going on vacation and will not be able to help me for about
a week, so he drove me to different places in the park and showed me trails and
other avenues of access to some of the Confederate and Union earthworks. I don't
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have much confidence that I will be able to find them since one's line of sight in the
forest only extends about 30 feet.
Friday, 24 Oct 2008
Stayed at the cottage today since the woods ay the Park are wet from the hard
rains we had yesterday and last night. I downloaded software off the Microsoft
website that will enable me to transfer the mapping data I have collected from the
Global Positioning System receiver to my desktop computer.
Monday, 27 Oct 2008
Began mapping the main Union breastworks from which the final attack was
launched. Starting at the Massachusetts Battery I mapped breastworks on the
Union right until they ended at the edge of a gorge. I did the same for the
breastworks on the Union left. They too stopped at the edge of a gorge. I mapped
the Massachusetts battery fortification itself and also the saps that started at the
fort and ran toward the Confederate line for about 100 yards.
In the afternoon, I attempted to get landowner permission to examine Redoubts #1
and #2 which are located on private property. Landowner for redoubt #2 was not
home and his gate had a padlock on it. Since he only has a small camper on the
property it appears he just uses it for weekend camping. Redoubt #1 landowner
also was not present but I talked to her son who gave me her phone number. My
conversation with the son led me to believe that all that remains of redoubt #1 is
some of the surrounding rifle trenches, the redoubt itself was probably leveled to
make a flat area for the house which sits high on a bluff overlooking the Blakeley
River. When I talked to the land owner by phone later in the evening, she would
not give me permission to examine her rifle pits
I also walked part of the Union lines located in the woods opposite Confederate
redoubt #7. The lines appeared intricate, and zig zaggy which will make them
harder to map.
Tuesday, 28 Oct 2008
Searched on foot for more of the main Union trenches but was unable to locate
them. Ranger Thomas took me in his pickup to show me where the Union trench
crosses the main Park road. They indeed were Union trenches, but I do not
believe they were the lines that were used to launch the final attack because they
are 1200 to 1500 yards from the Confederate line. The old maps show a Union
line maybe 600 to 800 yards from the Confederate line, but we could not find
where this closer line crosses the park road.
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We decided to try to walk the Union lines from the left of the Massachusetts
battery, which ended at a gorge. Ranger Thomas and I descended the gorge,
crossed a creek by walking across a fallen pine tree and picked up the Union
trench after ascending the other side of the gorge. We followed the union trench
about a mile through heavy woods and briars, and finally emerged on the park
road (where ranger James Johnson had been honking his truck’s horn periodically
so we could find our way better), but the trench ended about 30 yards short of the
road which explains why we could not find where it crossed. Unfortunately, I was
unable to get any mapping data due to the heavy forest coverage and the lousy
afternoon satellite coverage. I will try to map at least a portion of this line tomorrow
morning when the satellite coverage is better.
I also wandered through the brush and power line cuts trying to pick up the main
Union line on the other side of the road with no success.
Wednesday, 29 Oct 2008
Walked across the fallen pine tree again to map the union lines on the other side
of the creek. The satellite coverage was better than the previous afternoon but
steadily degraded as I went deeper into the woods. I had reception from 8
satellites when I crossed the creek, but after going a couple of hundred yards into
the woods I could only lock on to 4 of them, and it took about 5 minutes of waiting
at each waypoint before the solution was accurate enough to log a map point. At
that rate it would have taken all day to map the Union trenches plus I had other
concerns that caused me to abort the mapping of this part of the lines. I was close
to the eastern park boundary and I could hear a pack of deer hunting dogs barking
and yelping and getting closer to me with each passing minute, so I suspected that
some illegal deer hunting might be taking place and I had no desire to confront
poachers with guns and dogs. I was also concerned that if the satellite coverage
continued to degrade I would not be able to use the Global Positioning System
receiver to navigate my way out of the woods and back to the fallen pine tree
across the creek.
I found where the main Union trench opposite Confederate redoubt # 7 crossed a
park nature trail and was able to map it for several hundred yards in one direction
before it ended at a creek bottom which looked to be absolutely impenetrable. I will
have to find the creek on a map and see if I can find where the trench picks up on
the other side. Tomorrow morning I will also map the Union lines on the opposite
side of the nature trail, which should be challenging since a quick look at them
revealed what appeared to be a maize of interconnecting trenches and zig zags.
They are in the woods but the undergrowth looks passable.
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Thursday, 30 Oct 2008
I mapped the rest of the Union trenches opposite Confederate redoubt #7. They
were not as complex as I first thought but they had me going in circles until I
realized that I was mapping some of them for the second time.
I also mapped the Union trenches that cross the main park road about 1200 to
1500 yards from the Confederate line. In one direction the trenches are in the
woods and I mapped them until the underbrush became very thick. In the other
direction the land has been cleared but it has over two years growth of underbrush
and briars, which is almost impassable. The park rangers told me the area is
scheduled for a controlled burn in January and they invited me back after the burn
to finish the mapping. I mapped about 50 feet of the trench and gave up because
the briars were so thick.
Friday, 31 Oct 2008
Took my son and grandson to the park today so I did not get much mapping
accomplished.
Monday, 3 Nov 2008
I found where the main Union line crossed the park road. I mapped them
northward for about 50 yards until it stopped at a creek gorge. Southward I
mapped them for only 50 feet because the briars were so thick. I picked them up
again where the trench crossed a power line cut, but could only map them for
about 100 feet on either side of the cut.
In the afternoon ranger Thomas and I tried to find Confederate redoubt #3 by
following the trench line from Redoubt 4 through the woods until it stopped at
creek bottom. We crossed the creek bottom by walking across a 200 ft long
beaver dam. I told ranger Thomas I was not going back across the beaver dam
again and I would rather be air lifted out via helicopter. We found what appeared to
be a portion of redoubt #3 and it was just off of park property according to the
boundary markers (trees with blue paint on them). I tried to map it but could not
get enough satellites in view. I was able to map the Confederate trenches from
redoubt 4 to near the beaver dam and past the beaver dam for about 150 yards.
By the time we found redoubt 3 the satellite positioning was too unfavorable to
collect mapping data.
Since I did not want to re-cross the beaver dam, Thomas took me through the
swamp below the dam, which was just as unpleasant if not more so. I discovered
that waterproof boots are not that waterproof when you're wading in knee high
swamp water.
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Tuesday, 4 Nov 2008
I arrived at the park late since all the rangers were in a staff meeting until after
11:00 am. I found an excellent aerial photo that shows the area where we found
Redoubt 3 yesterday. It appears that access is much easier from the North if we
can get property owner approval for access. Ranger Tim took Thomas and I to the
north side of the park via public roads and showed us earthworks that he knew the
location of. He showed us an earthwork right on one of the main roads that he
believes is redoubt 2 or redoubt 3. It is about 100 yards from the earthwork
Thomas and I found yesterday, which we believed was redoubt 3. He also showed
us the northern end of the union line, which is on park property. I tried to map a
length of the trenches but satellite coverage was too poor.
Next Tim took us to the south side of the park and showed us the Union "Bluff
Battery". I was surprised to discover that it was actually two batteries side by side.
The larger one had six embrasures and the smaller one had two embrasures, so it
appears they could have mounted eight guns total. I was able to map both
batteries.
Wednesday, 5 Nov 2008
On Tuesday ranger James had cleared a path through the brush with his tractor
blade to give me easier access to Union trenches and batteries on the left end of
the union line. I mapped these earthworks this morning and found they were quite
extensive. These works are about 1000 to 1200 yards from the Confederate line
and included some of the primary Union artillery batteries.
In the afternoon I drove to Confederate redoubt #2 and was lucky to catch the
property owner on the premises. He allowed me to map the redoubt, which
appeared to include a well preserved redan which, according to the old maps had
a smaller redan on each side of the main center redan. Parts of the redoubt
extended past his property line on each side of the redan, which I was unable to
map. The property owner is a Civil war enthusiast and an amateur historian. His
profession is sign making and he expressed a desire to design and build some
interpretive signs for the park, which he would donate. I told him that I would
inform the park director of his generous offer which I did later in the afternoon. Ms.
Flirt seemed excited and eager to take him up on his offer. The park has no
interpretive signage in the park related to its Civil war history. Almost all of the
existing interpretive signs are related to the parks diverse natural history plus a
few that deal with the history of the Blakeley township.
He also told me that he was leasing property adjacent to the park property where
ranger Thomas and I had found what we believed to be redoubt 3 on Monday. He
told me that I could access the property he leased and map any earthworks that
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are there. He also warned that rattlesnakes were numerous in that particular area
based on his past experience.
Thursday, 6 Nov 2008
In the morning I mapped what Ranger Tim believes is Redoubt 3 which is on a
residential lot off of Cloverleaf Landing road. It appears that only one of the redans
remains (most of the Confederate redoubts at Blakeley were constructed as triple
redans). The redan wall has an opening in it like a road had been graded through
it at one time. Now the redan is completely overgrown with trees and underbrush.
There was a raised mound in the rear of the redan, which could be the remains of
the powder magazine or simply the pile of dirt left when someone graded the
opening in the wall. I was able to map only a portion of this mound due to the
underbrush. About half of the redan I was able to map by walking the parapet, the
rest I mapped by walking the outside perimeter due to the many fallen trees across
the parapet. If this was redoubt 3 then what was the redoubt that Thomas and I
had found on Monday? It was about 100 yards away from this one which is close
enough for it to be a part of the same redoubt.
Back in the park I found and mapped a large Confederate battery located about
300 yards behind redoubt 4. It was deep in the woods and it took me a long time to
find it. When I finished mapping it I programmed the handheld Global Positioning
System to navigate me back to my car, but unfortunately I ran into an impenetrable
wall of underbrush and briars. So I had no alternative but to retrace the circuitous
path that had brought me there.
Friday, 7 Nov 2008
I have been trying to contact Steve Jones of the Alabama Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources to ask if he can provide me with a digital
orthophoto base map for the Blakeley Park that I can use to overlay my
earthworks mapping data. He returned my call today, but I was not in the office so
I will need to send him an email to let him know exactly what I am looking for.
My mapping activities are winding down and I will begin concentrating more on the
research aspect of the project. I was able to map some more of the union trenches
today that were in the center of the Union line. I wasn't sure exactly how to find
them, but I was walking a logging road and discovered that the trenches crossed
the road and I was able to map about 100 yards of them.
Blakeley Park has been in the local news the past few days because they lost a
lawsuit brought by a local family who had squatted on park land for many years
when it was owned by International Paper Co. When the land was donated to the
park foundation in 1980, the foundation had the family's house condemned and
paid the family $ 80,000 to buy another one, and they were essentially evicted
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from park property. Just this week a judge awarded 3.5 acres of park property to
the family. The property is located adjacent to an exclusive residential area where
½ acre lots are probably sold at a pretty good premium. The feeling among the
park employees is that this local family is being manipulated by unscrupulous
lawyers who see an opportunity to gain title to some valuable land at the park's
expense.
Monday, 10 Nov 2008
Ranger Tin was supposed to take me to the north end of the union trenches this
morning, but he must have forgotten since he left the park early and is not
expected back before noon. The pig trail leading to the trenches is a little rough for
my little Toyota so Tim was going to take me in the Park pickup. He could probably
take me this afternoon when he returns but satellite positions will not allow me to
map in the afternoon in forest cover. I went back to the cottage to work on finding
a digital orthophoto basemap.
Received a return email from Steve Jones who made suggestions for state
websites where I could look for digital maps. He told me that Baldwin county had
some very high resolution digital maps but they are considered by the county to be
proprietary and not releasable to organizations or individuals unless a
Memorandum of Understanding is executed that guarantees the maps will not be
released to anyone else. I will let the park pursue the county maps and I will keep
searching the internet for a suitable map, preferably in color and having at least I
meter resolution.
Tuesday, 11 Nov 2008
Stayed at the cottage today to continue looking for a suitable basemap since the
park office is closed due to the holiday, and the park is staffed by a single ranger. I
downloaded several maps off the internet but I had difficulty importing some of the
formats such as MrSID compression and .img files into ArcView. It took me most
of the day figuring out how to overcome this difficulty, but finally was able to import
almost every format even though I still did not find a suitable base map that
included all of the park property. I downloaded some excellent color digital maps
from the Alabama department of agriculture website but they did not include the
eastern most areas of the park.
Wednesday, 12 Nov 2008
Spent the morning making overdue phone calls. Called the Redoubt 2 property
owner to get names of local residents having ancestors that were members of the
US Colored Troops that fought at Blakeley. He could only give me the name of
one (Pat Hollis) but said he would call me back with more. He also referred me to
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an article in the Mobile Monthly magazine that wrote about one such resident who
lives close to the park.
Called an archivist at the Museum of Mobile and made an appointment to examine
items in the McMillan collection that deal with Blakeley fortifications. I will pay them
a visit next Tuesday and Wednesday if needed.
Called Jim Robeson at GPServ to get clarification on proper procedures and
software to use when downloading the Global Positioning System mapping data
from the receiver and transferring it to a computer. He walked me thru the process
and emailed me a user's guide. He also made some recommendations on where
to look for high resolution imagery to use as a base map. He said that Alabama
was one of the worst states for trying to get free digital map imagery. In his opinion
Alabama state and county governments charge outrages prices for imagery that
was collected and processed using our tax dollars and which many states provide
for free.
Spent the afternoon surfing the net looking for mapping imagery. I found some 1
meter resolution imagery collected in 2006 that cost $50 for what I need. I also
found the exact same imagery for free with the disadvantage that one has to
download the entire county and the download time with DSL is 8 hours. I started
the free download about 8 pm.
Thursday, 13 Nov 2008
Woke up to discover that my PC had been automatically restarted by Microsoft to
incorporate an urgent security update. Of course this interrupted my imagery
download so I started it again.
Spent the day reading sources dealing with Blakeley fortifications (Mahan,
Andrews, Bergeron and the OR) and trying to download imagery. I started the 3rd
attempt at 5 pm. If it doesn't download this time I guess I will fork over the 50
bucks to get what I need.
I also read the Maurice Garland journal that the Alabama Dept of Archives copied
for me. According to Ms. Flirt he was one of the engineers that worked on the
Blakeley earthworks. I found out that he arrived at Blakeley on the same day that
the eight-day siege began so he was not involved in their design or construction.
His journal included several pages of engineering notes and sketches which were
notes transcribed almost word-for-word from Mahan's treatise on design and
construction of field fortifications.
The 3rd attempt to download the large image file of Baldwin County was
successful.
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Friday, 14 Nov 2008
Spent the day trying to get base map imagery loaded into the ArcView mapping
software. The software would not recognize the Baldwin County image even
though the image is in a compatible file format. Perhaps the image is too large and
exceeds the limits of the program.
I found the same 2006 imagery for sale in much smaller quarter-quadrangless for
only $7.50 each so I ordered the 2 maps that will include all of the park property.
These maps loaded successfully into ArcView and the 1 meter resolution looks
very good. When I load the earthworks mapping data into ArcView however, there
is a slight offset between the features visible in the imagery and my mapping data.
I estimate the offset to be about 10 to 16 feet. Played with the data and the
software for the rest of the day trying unsuccessfully to get everything to line up.
Emailed Jim Robeson at GPServ in Tallahassee for help.
Saturday, 15 Nov 2008
I finally got the mapping data and the imagery in perfect alignment by shifting the
image 20 feet northward. I did this by changing image alignment data contained in
the world files (text files that come with the image files). I emailed Jim Robeson
and told him to ignore the cry for help.
In his return email he said that such manipulations should not be necessary and
he suspected that I had a reference datum issue that prevented proper "projection"
of the mapping data into the same "projection" used by the image files.
Monday, 17 Nov 2008
Ranger Tim took me to the northern end of the Union trenches where I mapped
about 200 yards of them until the underbrush closed in too thick to proceed any
further. We drove down a logging road, got out and searched for the continuation
of the trenches but could not find them. Tim is very familiar with this area since he
marked all the timber for logging in this area about 3 years ago, and he new where
the trenches were - but the underbrush was so thick that you could only see about
ten feet ahead. We probably walked right past the trenches but simply could not
see them.
We drove a little further south down a power line cut and found where the trenches
crossed the cut. I was able to penetrate the underbrush on one side of the cut and
mapped about 50 to 75 yards of the Union trench line.
In the afternoon, I tutored myself on how to add titles and legends to my maps for
printing.
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Another email from Jim Robeson suggesting that I reorder the imagery, and
specify UTM projection, NAD83 reference datum, and units of meters. This would
assure that I would be able to accurately project the mapping data to align with the
imagery without having to manipulate the data in the world files.

Tuesday, 18 Nov 2008
Spent morning and afternoon at the Museum of Mobile looking at inventory
descriptions of manuscript items in the McMillan collection. This took a little time
since the collection has not been fully processed and there are 1377 items in the
collection.
I was looking for military correspondence dealing with the Blakeley earthworks.
There were many letters between commanders and engineering officers but they
were exclusively in the 1862 and 1863 time frame and dealt with the defenses of
the city of Mobile. There was no correspondence in the 1864 and 1865 time
frames when the Blakeley fortifications were started and completed.
Wednesday, 19 Nov 2008
Down loaded new maps per Jim Robeson's recommendation and loaded them into
Arcview. Results were same as before with a 6 meter/20 foot offset between
mapped features and the same features on the image map. I am convinced that
the image supplier CHARTIFF.com has an error in their world files. I believe they
failed to take into account the 6 pixel border they add to the images to make for
seamless boundaries when multiple images are combined into one image. The
alignment data in their world files is in error by exactly 6 pixels which equates to 6
meters for images having 1 meter per pixel resolution.
I also spent time learning how to add text and graphics to maps in Arcview, which
is not very user friendly. Read the user's manual on how to print hard copies and
how to print to a file that can be stored electronically and viewed using common
PC software.
Thursday, 20 Nov 2008
Spent all day creating maps for the park. I made two summary maps each with a
different basemap. One map has 2006 color aerial photography as the base map,
and the second uses much older U.S. Geological Survey topographical maps as
the base map. Shown on both maps are the features that I mapped. The U.S.
Geological Survey topographical maps also have many of the Civil War
earthworks mapped, and it interesting to see what I did not map compared to the
topo maps and conversely what I mapped that the U.S. Geological Survey did not.
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I also created a summary map that included labels for some of the more prominent
features of the fortifications. I then created smaller, more detailed maps for
Confederate Redoubts 2 thru 9, for the 15th Massachusetts Battery and for the
Union "Bluff" Battery.

Friday, 21 Nov 2008
I took my maps to a print shop and had them printed on a color laser printer. I was
pleased with the way they looked after printing. I took them to the park and
showed them to Ms. Flirt and ranger Thomas, who were pleased also. Ms. Flirt
again expressed her desire to develop a mapping capability in-house. Ranger
Thomas stated that he would have to receive training on Global Positioning
System receiver hardware and GIS software in order to achieve that goal. I
volunteered to spend a day with Thomas and walk him thru the process. Ms. Flirt
and Thomas seemed pleased with that suggestion.
We set the date for next Tuesday. Starting in the park I will provide training on
collecting mapping data using the Global Positioning System receiver, and in the
afternoon we will drive to my cottage and I will take him thru the process of
transferring the data from the receiver to the PC and exporting the data into the
ArcView mapping application along with the image files comprising the basemaps.
Monday, 24 Nov 2008
Seventy percent chance of rain predicted today so I did not go to the park. I
reviewed some of my reading material and typed research notes into EndNotes. I
am also trying to create a timeline of events for the Blakely earthworks from
conception to completion of construction.
Tuesday, 25 Nov 2008
Provided training to ranger Thomas on how to use the Global Positioning System
receiver to map physical features of the park. As a training exercise we mapped
the main entry road of the park and the roads of the primary park campgrounds.
I also called Dave Holt at GPServ and got some cost estimates for purchase of
used Global Positioning System mapping receivers and the data collection field
software. I passed these on to Ms. Flirt to follow up on when the park decides to
develop an in-house mapping capability. The offer was very reasonable I thought.
For 1500 dollars the park could purchase a survey quality receiver with sub-meter
accuracy. The same receiver sells new for $4300. The data collection software
would be an additional $265.
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In the afternoon I took ranger Thomas to my cottage where we could use my
desktop PC to create a map using ArcView and the data we had just collected. On
the map, the road survey data we collected overlayed perfectly with the roads
shown on the aerial imagery.
Wednesday, 26 Nov 2008 thru 30 Nov 2008
Celebrated the holidays with family members that arrived from New Orleans.
Monday, 1 Dec 2008
Returned to St. Cloud, FL from Point Clear, AL.
Thursday, 4 Dec 2008
Returned the handheld Global Positioning System receiver to Dave Holt of
GPServ in Sanford, FL.
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APPENDIX C: BLAKELEY MAPS

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

LIST OF REFERENCES
Andrews, C. C. History of the Campaign of Mobile; Including the Cooperative
Operations of Gen. Wilson's Cavalry in Alabama. New York: D. Van
Nostrand, 1867. Reprint, Barney E. Tyree, Jr., 1994.
Bergeron, Arthur W. Confederate Mobile. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi,
1991.
Burkhardt, George S. Confederate Rage, Yankee Wrath: No Quarter in the Civil
War. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2007.
Confederate States of America. Letters and Telegrams Sent by the Engineer
Bureau of the Confederate War Department, 1861-64, Chap. III, vols. 1-5
(College Park, Maryland: National Archives and Records Administration,
1965), Microcopy 628.
Dyer, Brainerd. “The Treatment of Colored Union Troops by the Confederates,
1861-1865.” The Journal of Negro History 20, no. 3 (1935): 273-286.
Edward (surname unknown), Tombigbee, AL to brother, 22 April 1865. Manuscript
Collection 5064, Museum of Mobile, Mobile, AL.
Gottschalk, Phil. In Deadly Earnest: The History of the First Missouri Brigade,
CSA. Columbia, Mo: Missouri River Press, 1991.
Gregory, John H., USS New London, Mobile Bay, to parents, 9 April 1865.
Manuscript Collection 3082, Museum of Mobile, Mobile, AL.
Hearn, Chester G. Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign: The Last Great Battles
of the Civil War. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1993.
Hess, Earl J. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern
Campaigns, 1861-1864. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2005.
Lash, Jeffery N. “A Yankee in Gray: Danville Leadbetter and the Defense of
Mobile Bay, 1861-1863.” Civil War History: A Journal of the Middle Period
37, no. 3 (1991): 197-218.
Liddell, St. John Richardson, and Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes. Liddell's Record.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.
138

Mahan, Dennis Hart. A Treatise on Field Fortification, Containing Instructions on
the Methods of Laying Out, Constructing, Defending, and Attacking
Intrenchments; with the General Outlines Also of the Arrangement, the
Attack and Defence of Permanent Fortifications. New York: J. Wiley, 1861.
Reprint Hardpress Publishing, 2007.
Maurice H. Garland Papers. Alabama Department of Archives and History,
Montgomery, AL.
Maury, Dabney Herndon. “The Defence of Mobile in 1865.” Southern Historical
Society Papers 3 (1877): 1-13.
McLellan, Alden. “Vivid Reminiscences of Wartimes.” Confederate Veteran 14
(1906): 264-266.
Moore, Elias, Fort Blakely, Alabama to mother, 10 April 1865. “The 114th Ohio
Volunteers” website, accessed 10 March 2009, available from
http://www.fortunecity.com/westwood/ makeover/347/id126.htm.
Nichols, James Lynn. Confederate Engineers. Tuscaloosa, AL: Confederate Pub.
Co., 1957.
________. “Confederate Engineers and the Defense of Mobile.” The Alabama
Review; A Quarterly Journal of Alabama History 12, no. 3 (1959): 181-194.
Prushankin, Jeffery S. A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith,
Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 2005.
Robinson, William M., Jr. “The Confederate Engineers.” The Military Engineer 22,
no. 125 (1930): 410-417.
Rubin, Anne Sarah. A Shattered Nation: The Rise and fall of the Confederacy,
1861-1868. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
Smith, John David. “Let Us All Be Grateful That We Have Colored Troops That
Will Fight.” In Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the Civil
War Era, edited by John David Smith, 1-77. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2002.
Stephenson, P. D. “Defence of Spanish Fort.” Southern Historical Society Papers
39 (1914): 118-129.

139

Taylor, Richard. Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Civil
War. New York: D. Appleton, 1879. Reprint, New York: De Capo Press,
1995.
United States War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 parts in 70 vols.
Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901. Reprint,
Harrisburg, PA: National Historical Society, 1971.

140

